PROPERTY--LANDLORD-TENANT-THE NEW JERSEY ANTI-EVICTION
ACT PROHIBITS FORECLOSING MORTGAGEES FROM EVICTING TENANTS OF THE DEFAULTED MORTGAGOR WITHOUT CAUSE-Chase

Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301
(1994).
A mortgage is defined as an interest in land that is created to
secure payment of a debt.' The two parties to a mortgage are the
mortgagor, who pledges property as security for a loan, and the
mortgagee, who takes the mortgage in exchange for extending the
loan. 2 The nature of the mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged
property can be explained according to one of three mortgage theories: the title theory, the lien theory, and the hybrid theory.' The
title theory states that the mortgagee has an immediate right to
possession of the mortgaged property upon execution of the mortgage. 4 In contrast, the lien theory maintains that the mortgagee is
never entitled to possession of the mortgaged property. 5 Contain1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (abr. 6th ed. 1991); see also ROBERT KRATOVIL,
MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1, at 23 (1972) (defining mortgage as a conveyance of property given to secure repayment of a debt).
While a discussion of mortgage law in its entirety is beyond the scope of this
Note, for varied commentary on the law of mortgages, see generally 12 JEROME J.
CURTIS, JR., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION (David A. Thomas, ed.,
1994); KRATOVIL, sup-a; 4 GEORGE E. OSBORNE, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (A.James
Casner ed., 1952 & Supp. 1977); 9 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1958); 10 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1957); WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES (1934).
For a discussion of mortgages in NewJersey, see generally 29 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM & SAUL TISCHLER, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE § 4, at 18-23 (1975); 30 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM & SAUL TISCHLER, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE (1975 & Supp. 1994).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (abr. 6th ed. 1991). A mortgagor is defined as the
party to the mortgage who pledges property to which he has title as security for a
loan. Id. A mortgagee, on the other hand, is the party to the mortgage who takes the
mortgage in exchange for extending the loan. Id.
3 OSBORNE, supra note 1, § 16.13, at 32. The title theory reflects the common law
understanding of a mortgage as a conveyance of legal title. 29 CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 1, § 3, at 13-14. The lien theory represents an equitable view of a
mortgage as a lien for security of a debt. Id. § 3, at 14. Adopting an intermediate
approach, the hybrid view contains aspects from both the tide and lien theories of
mortgages. Id.
4 29 CUNNINGHAM & TiSCHLER, supra note 1, § 3, at 14; CURTIS, supra note 1,
§ 101.01(b)(1), at 330; OSBORNE, supra note 1, § 16.14, at 32. Under the title theory,
the execution of a mortgage conveys legal title to the mortgagee who is therefore
entitled to immediate possession. CURTIS, supra note 1, § 101.01(b)(1), at 330. In
practice, however, the mortgagor is generally permitted to remain in possession of the
property until default. Id. § 101.01 (b)(1), at 331.
5 OSBoRNE, supra note 1, § 16.15, at 33. The lien theory characterizes a mortgage
as a lien to secure a debt. CURTIS, supra note 1, § 101.01 (b) (2), at 331. According to
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ing elements of both the title and lien theories, the hybrid theory
states that the mortgagee has a right to possession only after the
mortgagor has defaulted on the loan.6 NewJersey has adopted the
hybrid view.7
Consequently, under New Jersey law, a mortgagee is entitled
to possession of the mortgaged property when the mortgagor defaults on the loan.' Furthermore, a mortgagee who takes possession of the property has the right to eject both the defaulting
mortgagor and any of the mortgagor's tenants who entered into
leases after execution of the mortgage. 9 Until recently, a foreclosthis theory, the mortgagor retains legal tide to the property. Id. § 101.01 (b) (2), at
332. Consequently, the mortgagor is entitled to possession after the execution of the
mortgage. Id.
6 29 CUNNINGHAM & TiscHLER, supra note 1, § 3, at 14, 16. Under the hybrid
theory, the mortgagee is viewed as holding a lien against the property and is therefore
not entitled to possession. CURTIS, supra note 1, § 101.01 (b) (3), at 333. If the mortgagor defaults, however, the mortgagee is then treated as holding a legal interest
entitling the mortgagee to possession. Id. In contrast, a title theory state allows the
mortgagee to take possession after executing the mortgage. Id.
7 29 CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 1, § 3, at 14. At common law, a mortgage created an immediate fee simple estate in the mortgagee, who accordingly had
an immediate right to enter the mortgaged premises. Shields v. Lozear, 34 N.J.L. 496,
501 (1869) (citation omitted). In New Jersey, however, which otherwise follows the
common law, the mortgagee did not have a right to enter before default. Id.; see also
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 408, 1 A.2d 425, 428 (1938) (citations omitted) (stating that in NewJersey a mortgage only gave the mortgagee a right
of entry upon default); Stewart v. Fairchild-Baldwin, 91 N.J. Eq. 86, 88, 108 A. 301, 302
(1919) (citations omitted) (stating that New Jersey has not adopted the common law
rule granting the mortgagee an immediate right to possession).
8 Dorman v. Fisher, 31 N.J. 13, 14, 155 A.2d 11, 12 (1959) (citations omitted); see
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 N.J. Eq. at 408, 1 A.2d at 428 (citations omitted) (explaining
that a mortgagee does not have a right to possession until the mortgagor breaches an
obligation of the loan); Stewart, 91 N.J. Eq. at 88, 108 A. at 302 (citations omitted)
(stating that the mortgagee has the right to possession upon the mortgagor's breach
of condition); Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N.J.L. 157, 159, 167 A. 747, 748 (1933) (citation omitted) (stating that a mortgagee is entitled to possession after default); Hinck
v. Cohn, 86 N.J.L. 615, 617, 92 A. 378, 379 (1914) (citations omitted) (stating that the
mortgagee has the right to possession upon default); Shields, 34 N.J.L. at 501 (explaining that a mortgagee's right to possession is postponed until after default by the mortgagor); Sanderson v. Price, 21 N.J.L. 637, 646 n.a (1846) (Carpenter, J., dissenting)
(noting that prohibiting the mortgagee from ejecting the mortgagor until after default is contrary to the common law rule); see also 30 CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra

note 1, § 191, at 21 (explaining that under New Jersey law, the mortgagor is entitled
to possession until default); James E. Tonrey Jr., Comment, Protecting Tenants from
ForeclosingMortgagees: New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act in the Post-Guttenberg Era, 23 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1006, 1018 (1993) (stating that the mortgagor in New Jersey remained
in possession of the property until default).
9 Del-New Co., 111 NJ.L. at 159, 167A. at 748; see also Tonrey, supra note 8, at 101920 (explaining that a mortgagee in possession can eject those tenants whose interests
were created after the execution of the mortgage).
At common law, the mortgagee's possessory rights against the mortgagor's tenant

1294

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1292

after default hinged on the sequence in which the parties' interests were created. See
30 CUNNINGHAM & TiscmLER, supra note 1, § 193, at 28 (stating that a mortgagee's
rights against a tenant depend upon which party held the prior interest); Tonrey,
supra note 8, at 1014-22 (outlining the respective rights of the mortgagee and the
tenant both at common law and in NewJersey based on which party held the prior-intime, superior interest). If the lease preceded the mortgage, the tenant held the paramount right and could not be removed by the mortgagee until the end of the lease
term. Id. at 1016-17 & n.29 (noting that a mortgage executed subsequent to a lease
entitled a mortgagee, upon default, to the mortgagor's reversion under the lease); 30
CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 1, § 193, at 28 (commenting that the rights of a
prior-in-time lessee cannot be destroyed by the mortgagor's default unless the lessee
subordinates his rights to those of the mortgagee's). If, however, the mortgage precedes the lease, the mortgagee holds the superior interest and can remove both the
defaulting mortgagor and those tenants who hold subsequent leases. See Tonrey,
supra note 8, at 1015 & nn.22-23 (quotation and citations omitted) (explaining that
tenants who enter into leases subsequent to a mortgage take their interests subject to
that mortgage, and therefore have no greater rights than the mortgagor-landlord
upon default).
A tenant could avoid removal by attorning to the mortgagee. Hinch, 86 N.J.L. at
617, 92 A. at 379; Shields, 34 NJ.L. at 500-01; see also Del-New Co., 111 N.J.L. at 159-60,
167 A. at 748 (stating that the tenant is able to defeat the rights of the landlord by
attorning to the mortgagee). To attorn is "[tio agree to become tenant to one as
owner or landlord of an estate previously held of another, or to agree to recognize a
new owner of a property or. estate and promise payment of rent to him." BLACK'S LAW
DIcrioN Y 85 (abr. 6th ed. 1991); see also Del-New Co., 111 N.J.L. at 159, 167 A. at 748
(stating that attornment is "an act by which a tenant acknowledges his obligation to a
new landlord"). By agreeing to pay rent to the mortgagee after the mortgagor-landlord has defaulted, the tenant avoids ejectment and puts the mortgagee in constructive possession of the property. Del-New Co., 111 NJ.L. at 160, 167 A. at 748 (citations
omitted). See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for further discussion of
attornment.
After default, the mortgagee may institute foreclosure proceedings to force the
judicial sale of the property to satisfy the debt. Harold N. Hensel, Note, New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act ProhibitsRemoval of Residential Tenants by ForeclosingMortgagee Upon Default of Landlord-Mortgagor,Absent "Good Cause", 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 311, 322
(1980). In order to terminate a subordinate tenancy connected to the property, the
tenant must generally be joined in the foreclosure suit. Ellveeay Newspaper Worker's
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wagner Mkt. Co., 110 N.J.L. 577, 580, 166 A. 332, 333 (1933),
affd, 112 N.J.L. 88, 169 A. 692 (1934) (citation omitted); accord American-Italian
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467, 471, 189 A. 118, 120 (1937) (citations
omitted); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Gerber Bros. Realty Co., 123 N.J. Eq. 511, 513,
199 A. 7, 8 (Ch. 1938) (quotation and citation omitted); see 30 CUNNINGHAM & Tiscm-nni, supra note 1, § 229, at 99. If the tenant is not joined in the proceedings, a
foreclosure will not affect the existence of the tenancy. EUveeay, 110 N.J.L. at 580, 166
A. at 333 (quotation omitted).
To preserve the right to collect a deficiency from the mortgagor, the mortgagee
should join the mortgagor's tenants to the foreclosure suit. See 30 CUNNINGHAM &
TiscH-Ent, supra note 1, § 193, at 31. If, however, the mortgagee can prove that failing
tojoin the tenant did not affect the vendible value of the property or that the mortgagee had agreed to another method to determine the value of the property, failing to
join the tenant will not impair the mortgagee's rights. Id. § 193, at 31-32; see also
Harvester Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Elbaum, 119 N.J.L. 437, 441, 196 A. 709, 711 (1938)
(concluding that it is not necessary to join the tenant to the foreclosure when the
existence of the tenancy does not lessen the vendible value of the property); Stratford
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ing mortgagee's right to remove the mortgagor's tenants was settled law."
In 1974, the NewJersey Legislature enacted the Anti-Eviction
Act 1 1 (the Act), which significantly modified a landlord's ability to
remove a residential tenant from leased premises.' 2 Prior to the
Act's passage, a landlord in New Jersey possessed a nearly unlimited right to eject a tenant at the end of the lease.13 Pursuant to
the Act, however, a landlord who cannot establish one of the statutory grounds for eviction may not evict a residential tenant at the
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wagner, 122 N.J. Eq. 452, 453-54, 194 A. 440, 440-41 (Ch.1937)
(stating that the mortgagor cannot assert the failure to join the tenant as a defense to
the foreclosure suit when the mortgagor previously agreed with the court's property
valuation). See infta notes 49-54 and accompanying text for further development of
the need to join tenants to the foreclosure suit.
10 Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 626, 428 A.2d 1289, 1294
(1981) (citations omitted); Hensel, supranote 9, at 323 (referring to the mortgagee's
right to remove the mortgagor's tenant as "the heretofore settled property law principles attendant to the mortgage relationship"). Hensel further declared that Guttenberg rendered the traditional mortgage relationship "dangerously unsettled." Id.
The mortgagee's right to remove a subsequent tenant is subject to the practice of
attornment and the requirement of joining the tenant to the foreclosure suit. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text and infra notes 41-48 and 49-54 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of attornment and the necessity of making a subsequent tenant a party to the foreclosure suit).
11 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
12 Note, New Rights For New Jersey Tenants-"Good Cause" Evictions and "Reasonable"
Rents, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 565, 565-66 (1974).
13 See id. at 566. To evict a tenant, the landlord only had to comply with New
Jersey's summary dispossess statute, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 to -61. See
id. at 568 & n.19. Before it was amended by the Act, New Jersey's summary dispossess
statute stated in pertinent part:
Any lessee or tenant... may be removed from such premises by the
county district court.. . in an action in the following cases:
a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession ...
after the expiration of his term ....
b. Where such person shall hold over after default in the payment
of rent, pursuant to the agreement under which the premises are held.
c. Where such person (1) shall be so disorderly as to destroy the
peace and quiet of the other tenants. . . or (2) shall willfully destroy,
damage or injure the premises, or (3) shall constantly violate the landlord's rules and regulations governing said premises .. .or (4) shall
commit any breach or violation of any of the covenants or agreements
...contained in the lease ... where a right of re-entry is reserved in the
lease for a violation of such covenants or agreements, and shall hold
over and continue in possession ... after the landlord... has caused a
written notice of the termination of said tenancy to be served upon said
tenant ....
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1952). The legislature amended § 2A:18-53 of the
summary dispossess statute to read: "Except for residential lessees and tenants included in § [2A:18-61.1], any lessee or tenant... may be removed... in the following
cases.... " N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (footnote omitted).
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14 See § 2A:18-61.3(a) (stating that "[n]o landlord may evict or fail to renew any
lease of any premises covered by [this Act] except for good cause as defined in [this
Act]") (footnote omitted). Under the Act, residential tenants can no longer be
evicted solely because the lease term has expired. 25 Fairmount Ave., Inc. v. Stockton,
130 N.J. Super. 276, 284, 326 A.2d 106, 111 (Bergen County Ct. 1974). Rather, the
landlord must establish good cause as defined by the Act to evict a tenant. See
§ 2A:18-61.1 (providing that "[n]o lessee or tenant . . . may be removed ... except
upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause"). Section 2A-1861.1 states that a tenant or lessee may not be evicted unless: (a) the person does not
pay the rent owed under the lease; (b) the person continually engages in disorderly
conduct, impairing the "peace and quiet" of other occupants; (c) the person willfully
or through gross negligence destroys, damages, or injures the premises, or allows such
to occur; (d) the person continually breaches reasonable rules and regulations agreed
to at the commencement of the term; (e) the person continually violated reasonable
covenants agreed to at the beginning of the term, the violation of which allows the
landlord to reenter the premises; (f) the person fails to pay a valid and not unconscionable rent increase; (g) the landlord or owner (1) wants to board up the premises
because of serious health and safety violations, (2) wishes to remove the tenant in
order to correct such violations, (3) seeks to correct an unlawful occupancy, or (4) is
a governmental agency retiring the premises from rental use in compliance with a
redevelopment plan; (h) the owner wishes to permanently retire the premises from
residential use for reasons not covered in § 2A18-61.1(g); (i) the tenant refuses to
agree to reasonable changes to the terms of the lease proposed by the landlord or
owner; (j) the person repeatedly and unjustifiably fails to pay the rent owed; (k) the
landlord or owner changes the property from a rental unit to a condominium, cooperative or fee simple ownership of at least two units; (0 the owner of three or less
units wants to personally occupy or has sold the premises to a buyer wanting to personally occupy the premises and the contract requires the premises to be vacant; (m)
the employment upon which the tenancy was conditioned has ceased; (n) the person
has been convicted or plead guilty to certain drug offenses occurring in the premises;
(o) the person has been convicted or plead guilty to an assault or terrorist threat
against the landlord, his family or employees; (p) the person has been found civilly
liable for offenses described in (n) & (o). § 2A:18-61.1. By limiting the circumstances
under which a landlord can lawfully remove a tenant from his property, the Act affects the landlord's substantive right to possession. 25 Fairmount Ave., Inc., 130 N.J.
Super. at 283, 326 A.2d at 110. Specifically, the Act effectively deprives the landlord
of his right to possession of the leased property unless the landlord can demonstrate
he is entitled to possession under § 2A:18-61.1. Id. at 283-84, 326 A.2d at 110-11.
The purpose of the Act is to protect residential tenants from the effects of a
housing shortage by prohibiting evictions unless statutory cause is established and
proper notice is given. A.P. Dev. Corp. v. Band, 113 N.J. 485, 492, 550 A.2d 1220,
1224 (1988) (quotation omitted). This purpose is reflected in a statement which accompanied the Act as it was proposed in the Assembly:
At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the
reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential
tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have
not caused any problems. This is a serious matter, particularly now that
there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey. This
act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds
and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
447 Assocs. v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 527, 559 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1989) (quoting State-
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In 1986, the New Jersey Legislature amended, inter alia, section 2A:18-61.3 of the Anti-Eviction Act to provide that, except in
limited circumstances, an "owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession" may not evict the existing tenants absent
good cause. 5 This particular amendment spurred debate as to
whether the New Jersey Legislature intended the Act to modify a
foreclosing mortgagee's right to evict tenants. 6
ment Accompanying Assembly Bill No. 1586 at 4 (1974); see also A.P. Dev. Corp., 113
N.J. at 492, 550 A.2d at 1224 (quotation omitted); Montgomery Gateway East I v.
Herrera, 261 N.J. Super. 235, 241, 618 A.2d 865, 868 (App. Div. 1992) (citations omitted). The NewJersey Legislature viewed this Act as remedial legislation and intended
it to be liberally construed. 447 Assocs., 115 N.J. at 529, 559 A.2d at 1365 (citations
omitted); A.P. Dev. Corp., 113 N.J. at 506, 550 A.2d at 1231; § 2A:18-61.2 (historical
note) (quotation omitted).
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994). With the addition of
subsection (b), § 2Ai18-61.3 now states:
a. No landlord may evict or fail to renew any lease of any premises covered by [the Act] except for good cause as defined in [the Act].
b. A person who was a tenant of a landlord in premises covered by [this
Act] may not be removed by any order or judgment for possession from
the premises by the owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession except:
(1) For good cause in accordance with the requirements [of this
Act]; or
(2) For proceedings in premises where federal law supersedes applicable State law governing removal of occupants; or
(3) For proceedings where removal of occupants is sought by an
authorized State or local agency pursuant to eminent domain or code
or zoning enforcement laws and which comply with applicable relocation laws ....Where the owner's or landlord's successor in ownership
or possession is not bound by the lease entered into with the former
tenant and may offer a different lease to the former tenant, nothing in
P.L. 1986, c.138 shall limit that right.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16 See Chase Manhattan Bank v.Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 213, 638 A.2d 1301, 1303
(1994) (citation omitted) (considering whether the amended Act applies to foreclosing mortgagees seeking to evict the defaulted mortgagor's tenant). Those courts and
commentators considering the issue have arrived at differing conclusions. See e.g.,
Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1042-43 (arguing that the Legislature intended to subject
foreclosing mortgagees to the Act when it amended § 2A:18-61.3). But see Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 236, 638 A.2d at 1314 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the 1986 amendments do not clearly indicate a legislative intent to require foreclosing mortgagees to comply with the Act).
Questions concerning the Act's applicability to foreclosing mortgagees also arose
before the 1986 amendments were enacted. See Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623, 428 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1981) (questioning the applicability of
the pre-amended Act to foreclosing mortgagees). Again, as after the 1986 amendments, legal opinions differed as to the pre-amendment Act's applicability. Hensel,
for example, argued that the Act should not apply to foreclosing mortgagees. Hensel,
supra note 9, at 325. According to the commentator, granting a subsequent tenant
superior rights over a prior mortgagee contradicts the priority scheme set forth in the
recording acts. Id. Allowing the tenant to remain in possession may also reduce the
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In a recent decision, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 7 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the amended
Act required a foreclosing mortgagee to establish statutory good
cause to evict a defaulting mortgagor's tenant from' the premises.1 8
Concluding that the key phrase added by the 1986 amendments1 9
encompassed foreclosing mortgagees, the supreme court held that
the Act prohibited a foreclosing mortgagee from evicting a tenant
without statutory cause.2" Furthermore, the court declared that a
foreclosing mortgagee must comply with the requirements of the
Act irrespective of whether a tenant's interest predated the
21
mortgage.
Marion and Seymour Josephson first obtained possession of
the property at issue in Chase in April, 1973, under a one year writvalue of the property at the foreclosure sale, thereby impairing the value of the mortgagee's security. Id. But see Guttenberg, 85 NJ. at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that, as a remedial statute, the Act should be liberally construed to give tenants the broadest possible protection); Charles C. Cornelio, Note,
The Effect of Anti-Eviction Statutes on ForeclosingMortgagees, 4 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 361,
363 (1985) (arguing that the Act should apply to foreclosing mortgagees to promote
the legislative goal of protecting residential tenants from the effects of a housing
shortage).
17 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994).
18 Id. at 213, 638 A.2d at 1303. The court specifically focused on § .A'18-61.3 of
the Act. Id. (quotation omitted); see § 2A:18-61.3 (prohibiting landlords and landlords' and owners' successors in interest from evicting tenants without cause). For the
full text of § 2A:18-61.3, see supra note 15. See supra note 14 for a list of the permissible grounds for eviction. In particular, the court considered whether the restrictions
imposed by § 2A:18-61.3 applied to foreclosing mortgagees. Chase Manhattan Bank,
135 N.J. at 213.
19 See § 2A:18-61.3(b) (prohibiting an "owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession" from evicting a tenant without cause).
20 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314. The court noted that
this decision superseded the decision reached in Guttenberg. Id. at 235, 638 A.2d at
1314.
At the time of the Guttenberg decision, § 2A:18-61.3 stated: "No landlord may
evict, or fail to renew any lease of any premises covered by... this Act except for good
cause . . . . " § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987). The Guttenbergcourt held that a foreclosing
mortgagee attempting to evict a tenant who entered into a lease subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage was not bound by the restrictions in the Act. Guttenberg,85
N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. Based upon the original language of the Act, the court
reasoned that statute applied only to "traditional landlord-tenant relationship[s]." Id.
For a detailed discussion of the Guttenbergdecision, see infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
21 See Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314. But cf Guttenberg, 85
N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292 (holding that the Act did not prevent a foreclosing
mortgagee from evicting a tenant in possession when the mortgage was created
before the leasehold); Hensel, supra note 9, at 322-24 (arguing that allowing a subsequent lease to have priority over a prior mortgage contradicts the policy of New
Jersey's recording acts). For a discussion of the mortgagee's common law right to
remove a tenant holding a prior or subsequent lease, see supra note 9.
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ten lease, renewed annually until 1978.22 Thereafter, the Josephsons remained in possession of the property based on an oral
agreement with the owner to renew the tenancy on a monthly basis. 23 In 1987, Saul and Grace Werner purchased the property
from the Carteret School for Boys and entered into a mortgage
agreement with Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) .24 Three years
later, after the Werners defaulted on the mortgage, Chase instituted foreclosure proceedings.2 ' The Werners avoided foreclosure
by conveying property title to the bank in March, 1991.26
Arguing that it was entitled to exclusive possession of the property, Chase amended its complaint to join the Josephsons and
other tenants to the foreclosure action.27 Rather than answering
the complaint, the Josephsons asked Chase for time to locate another residence. 28 Assenting to the request, Chase submitted a motion for summary judgment which the New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division granted in January, 1992. 9 One month later,
the Public Advocate filed a motion on the Josephsons' behalf reruling or grant
questing that the chancery division reconsider its
30
the Josephsons relief from the court's judgment.
22 ChaseManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 215, 638 A.2d at 1304. The Josephsons rented
and occupied one of three single-family homes owned by the Carteret School for Boys
Id. Each home rented for $550 to $560 per month. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. In addition to executing a mortgage, the Werners assigned the rents and
leases from the property to Chase. Id. The mortgage and deed stipulated that a default by the mortgagor entitled the mortgagee to possession. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. By accepting title, Chase obtained an ownership interest in the property in
addition to the possessory interest it had obtained when the Werners defaulted. Id.
27 Chase sought to evict the Josephsons and the other tenants because the bank
believed the current rents did not reflect the fair market value of the property. Id. at
215-16, 638 A.2d at 1304. Chase contended that it was entitled to exclusive possession
because its mortgage was not subject to any encumbrances. Id. at 216, 638 A.2d at
1304. The case against the other tenants was later dismissed by the appellate division
because the tenants voluntarily left the premises. Id. (citing Chase Manhattan Bank,
261 N.J. Super. 428, 433, 619 A.2d 241, 244 (App. Div.), rev'd, 135 N.J. 209, 235, 638
A.2d 1301, 1314 (1994)).
28 Id.
29 Id. Chase accepted a summary judgment in lieu of a default judgment and eviction order against the Josephsons. Id. Following the judgment, Chase continued to
allow the Josephsons to remain on the property rent-free while they prepared to relocate. Id.
30 Id. The Public Advocate based the motion for reconsideration on Rule 4:49-2,
which states:
[A] motion for rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend
a judgment or order shall be served not later than 10 days after service
of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party obtaining it. The
motion shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, includ-
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Denying the motion, the chancery division stayed execution of
its order for possession . l The court found that the 1986 amendments to the Act did not so clearly apply to or include foreclosing
mortgagees as to supersede the Guttenberg ruling. Furthermore,
the chancery division determined that Guttenberg controlled even
though the Josephsons' tenancy began before the mortgage was
created. 3
Subsequently, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the lower court's ruling. 4 Initially, the appellate division explained that the holding in Guttenbergdid not prevent the
eviction of a tenant with a prior interest who does not have a
lease.3 5 The court then held that Chase could evict the Josephsons
ing a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel
believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred.
N.J. CT. R. 4:49-2. The motion for relief from the judgment was made pursuant to
Rule 4:50-1 (f), which states: "[ o ] n motion ... the court may relieve a party ... from a
final judgment or order... or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order." NJ. CT. R. 4:50-1(f).
In support of the motion, the Public Advocate advanced two arguments. See
Chase ManhattanBank, 135 NJ. at 216, 638 A.2d at 1304-05. First, the Public Advocate
asserted that foreclosing mortgagees were now subject to the eviction restrictions contained in the Act by virtue of the 1986 amendments. Id., 638 A.2d at 1304. See supra
note 15 for pertinent text of the 1986 amendments. Secondly, the Public Advocate
argued that the Guttenberg decision prevented Chase from evicting the Josephsons
because their tenancy existed prior to Chase's mortgage. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135
N.J. at 216, 638 A.2d 1304-05; see also Guttenberg Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J.
617, 623, 428 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1981) (holding that a foreclosing mortgagee may evict
a tenant without complying with the Act when the mortgage was executed prior to the
leasehold).
31 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 216-17, 638 A.2d at 1305. The chancery division stayed execution of the judgment to allow for an appeal. Id. at 217, 638 A.2d at
1305. The stay provided that theJosephsons reimburse Chase for past rent previously
excused and resume paying rent for the premises. Id.
32 Id. at 216-17, 638 A.2d 1305. The Guttenbergcourt held that the original Act did
not apply to foreclosing mortgagees attempting to evict tenants whose leases were
created subsequent to the mortgage. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. See
infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Guttenberg
decision.
33 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 216, 638 A.2d at 1305. The Guttenberg court
considered the applicability of the Act to foreclosing mortgagees when the mortgage
predated the tenant's lease. See Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. In the
instant case, the Josephsons were in possession of the property under an oral monthto-month tenancy agreement since 1978. ChaseManhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 215, 638
A.2d at 1304. Chase entered into the mortgage agreement with the Werners in 1987.
Id.
34 Chase Manhattan Bank, 261 NJ. Super. 428, 430, 619 A.2d 241, 243 (App. Div.
1993), rev'd, 135 N.J. 209, 235, 638 A.2d 1301, 1314 (1994).
35 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 217, 638 A.2d at 1305 (citation omitted). The
Guttenbergruling addressed situations involving a leasehold. Guttenberg,85 NJ. at 623,
428 A.2d at 1292. The appellate division acknowledged, however, that the distinction
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without cause because the 1986 amendments did not clearly evidence the Legislature's intent to subject foreclosing mortgagees to
the requirements of the Act. 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification 7 to
determine whether the addition of the words "an owner's or landlord's successors in possession or ownership" made the Act applicable to foreclosing mortgagees attempting to evict the tenants of a
defaulting mortgagor.3 " Before resolving the central issue, the majority opined that the Act, as enacted in 1974, would have prohibited Chase from evicting the Josephsons without cause because the
Josephsons' tenancy existed prior to the mortgage.3 9 Next, in a
four to three decision, the court held that the amendment to section 2A:18-61.3 made the Act applicable to a foreclosing mortgagee

attempting to evict a tenant whose tenancy was created either
before or after the mortgage was executed.o
Prior to the passage of the Act, a mortgagee's common law
right to evict a defaulted mortgagor's tenant was subject to the tenant's right to attorn to the mortgagee. 4' Addressing this right in
between a leasehold and a tenancy would be of no consequence if the amended Act
applied to foreclosing mortgagees. ChaseManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 217, 638 A.2d at
1305 (citation omitted).
36 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 217, 638 A.2d at 1305 (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 214, 638 A.2d at 1303 (citing Chase ManhattanBank, 133 N.J. 439, 440, 627
A.2d 1144, 1145 (1993)).
38 Id. at 213, 638 A.2d at 1303 (quoting § 2A:18-61.3(b)). Before this case reached
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the parties settled their dispute. Id. at 214, 638
A.2d at 1303-04 (citation and footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the court chose to
decide the case due to the significant public issues involved. Id.
39 Id. at 223-24, 638 A.2d at 1308. Because NewJersey case law considers a monthto-month tenancy to be "a continuing relationship," the court concluded that the
Josephsons' tenancy predated the mortgage. Id. at 224, 638 A.2d at 1308 (quoting
Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 89 N.J. 576, 583, 446 A.2d 862, 865
(1982)) (citation omitted). Consequently, the court reasoned that Chase became the
Josephsons' landlord when the Werners defaulted and was therefore subject to the
provisions of the Act. Id.
40 Id. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314. Section 2A:18-61.3(b) states that a tenant of the
former landlord cannot be evicted by the landlord's or owner's successor in interest
except for the reasons stated in the Act. § 2A:18-61.3(b). For the full text of§ 2A:1861.3, see supra note 15. The instant case therefore supersedes the court's ruling in
Guttenberg, which considered the applicability of the Act to foreclosing mortgagees
prior to the 1986 amendments. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at
1314.
41 Del-New Co. v.James, 111 N.J.L. 157, 159-60, 167 A. 747, 748 (1933); Hinck v.
Cohn, 86 N.J.L. 615, 617, 92 A. 378, 379 (1914); Shields v. Lozear, 34 N.J.L. 496, 500
(1869). For an outline of the mortgagee's common law right to possession against the
defaulted mortgagor and the mortgagor's tenants, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.

1302

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1292

Del-New Co. v. James,4 2 the Supreme Court of NewJersey considered
whether a legal attornment could be achieved when the mortgagor
was not notified of the mortgagee's demand for rent.4 3 The tenant
in Del-New Co. refused to pay rent to the landlord-mortgagor, stating that he had already paid the demanded rent to the mortgagee. 4 Resolving the issue, the court held that a valid attornment
had occurred, and that the tenant was not liable to the mortgagor
for the rent.45
The court began its analysis by noting that a tenant no longer
had an obligation to obtain the consent of the landlord to attorn to
the mortgagee.4 6 Because the mortgagee could eject the tenant,
the court reasoned, the tenant had the right to attorn to the mortgagee to remain in possession of the premises. 47 In addition, the
court concluded that once the tenant exercised his right to attorn
by paying the demanded rent to the mortgagee, the mortgagor
could not compel the tenant to pay rent to him as well.48
The mortgagee's right to evict an existing tenant was further
conditioned upon the requirement that the tenant be joined in the
491
foreclosure suit against the mortgagor to terminate the tenancy.
In Ellveeay Newspaper Worker's Building & Loan Association v. Wag42 111 N.J.L. 157, 167 A. 747 (1933).
43 Id. at 158, 159, 167 A. at 747.
44 Id. at 158, 167 A. at 747. After the mortgagor had defaulted, the mortgagee
gave notice to the tenant to pay the rent to the mortgagee. Id. Similar notice was not
given to the mortgagor. Id. at 159, 167 A. at 747. The tenant complied with the
notice and paid the rent to the mortgagee. Id. at 158, 167 A. at 747. The mortgagor
subsequently sued the tenant for the rent the tenant had paid to the mortgagee. Id.
45 Id. at 160-61, 162, 167 A. at 748, 749 (quotation omitted).
46 Id. at 159, 167 A. at 748. The court explained that:
At common law ... [attornment] never became effectual without
the consent or knowledge of the landlord or by due process of law. At
common law the owners could not alienate without the consent of a
tenant, which consent was called an attornment, nor could the tenancy
be substituted by the act of the tenant without the consent of the lord.
It will be seen that mutuality of consent, either voluntary or constructive, was necessary to make out an attornment. This rigid rule was later
relaxed ....
Id. (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 159-60, 167 A. at 748 (citation omitted).
48 Id. at 162, 167 A. at 749. The court explained that by attorning to the mortgagee, the tenant places the mortgagee in constructive possession of the premises. Id. at
160, 167 A. at 748 (citations omitted). The court further observed that attornment
creates a new tenancy with the mortgagee, thereby barring the mortgagor from recovering additional rents from the tenant. Id. at 161, 167 A. at 748 (quotation and citations omitted).
49 30 CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supranote 1, § 229, at 99; see supranote 9 (explaining that tenants with leases subsequent to a mortgage must generally be joined to the
foreclosure suit in order to terminate the tenancy).
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ner,56 the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the effect that a
foreclosure suit had on a tenant who was not made a party to the
suit.51 In Ellveeay, Northfield Realty Corporation defaulted on its
mortgage. 2 Ellveeay, the mortgagee, foreclosed on the mortgage
but did not make the tenant, the Wagner Market Corporation, a
party to the suit."3 Reasoning that a foreclosure terminates an existing tenancy only if the tenant is made a party to the suit, the
court held that the Wagner Market Company's lease was unaffected by the foreclosure.54
The Supreme Court of New Jersey first considered whether
the Anti-Eviction Act modified the common law rights of foreclosing mortgagees in Guttenberg Savings & Loan Association v. Rivera.5 5

The mortgagors in Guttenberg gave a mortgage to Guttenberg Savings and Loan Association (Guttenberg) to secure a loan taken to
purchase a residential apartment building.56 Following the mortgagor's default, Guttenberg instituted foreclosure proceedings and
demanded possession.57 Alleging that the mortgagee had no right
to evict them, the tenants in possession resisted Guttenberg's
50 110 N.J.L. 577, 166 A. 332 (1933), aftfd, 112 N.J.L. 88, 169 A. 692 (1934).
51 Id. at 579-80, 166 A. at 333.
52 Id. at 578, 166 A. at 332. On April 29, 1927, Northfield Realty Corporation
executed a mortgage in favor of Ellveeay Newspaper Worker's Building and Loan
Association (Elveeay). Id. at 577-78, 166 A. at 332. On October 13, 1927, the Wagner
Market Company entered into a ten-year lease on the property. Id. at 578, 166 A. at
332. Northfield later defaulted on the mortgage, prompting Ellveeay to institute foreclosure proceedings. Id. Ellveeay named Wagner as a party to that suit, which was
subsequently discontinued. Id.
53 Id. Northfield executed a second mortgage on February 4, 1930 and Wagner
subordinated its lease to the mortgage in April, 1930. Id. Once again, Northfield
defaulted on the mortgage. Id. Consequently, Ellveeay instituted foreclosure proceedings, but did not make Wagner a party to the suit. Id. Ellveeay purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale in June, 1932. Id.
54 Id. at 580, 166 A. at 333. Joining a tenant to the foreclosure suit is also necessary
to extinguish all the interests in the property, which is required before the mortgagee
can sue on the mortgage bond. SeeAmerican-Italian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Liotta, 117
N.J.L. 467, 471-72, 189 A. 118, 120 (1937) (quotation and citation omitted).
55 85 N.J. 617, 623, 428 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1981). At the time of the Guttenberg
decision, the Act referred solely to landlords and owners. See, e.g., § 2A:18-61.3 (West
1952) (prohibiting only landlords and owners from evicting tenants without cause);
cf.§ 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (including a reference to "the owner's or
landlord's successor in ownership or possession"); § 2A:18-61.lh(e) (West Supp.
1994) (stating that the owner of a structure does not include a mortgagee in possession through foreclosure).
56 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 620, 428 A.2d at 1291. John Scirocco and Frank Annese
executed a purchase money mortgage in 1966. Id.
57 Id. The mortgagors defaulted in 1978. Id. In the suit, Guttenberg named the
mortgagors, judgment creditors, subsequent purchasers, and five existing tenants
holding subordinate leases. Id.
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demand.5 8
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered
whether a mortgagee foreclosing on a residential apartment building must satisfy the provisions of the Act to evict tenants who entered into leases subsequent to the creation of the mortgage. 9
Concluding that the Act pertained only to traditional landlord-tenant relationships, the court ruled that a mortgagee could evict a
subsequent tenant without complying with the Act.' °
Writing for the majority, Justice Schreiber discussed four
points supporting the court's conclusion that the Legislature did
not intend foreclosing mortgagees to be constrained by the Act.6
First, the court declared that the repeated use of the words "landlord" and "tenant" throughout the Act clearly indicated that the
Act applied only to a landlord-tenant relationship.6 2 Second, the
58 Id. The tenants presented two arguments at trial. See id. at 620-21, 428 A.2d at
1291. First, the tenants asserted that Guttenberg could not evict them because the
bank had not established a ground for eviction under the Act. Id. at 620, 428 A.2d at
1291. The trial court rejected this contention, determining that § 2A.18-61.1 applied
only to summary dispossess actions brought in county district court. Id. at 620-21, 428
A.2d at 1291; see § 2A:18-61.1 (stating that "[n]o lessee or tenant ... may be removed
by the county district court or the superior court"). Secondly, the tenants maintained
that the Act applied because the bank had become a landlord as a result of the tenants' rejected offer to attorn to it. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 621, 428 A.2d at 1291. Rejecting this argument, the court reaffirmed its prior holding. Id. Reversing the trial
court, however, the appellate division concluded that removal actions instituted in
superior court were also subject to the Act. Id. at 622, 428 A.2d at 1292. The court
therefore held that foreclosing mortgagees were required to comply with the Act's
provisions. Id. (citation omitted). See generaUy Hensel, supra note 9, at 321-24 (criticizing the appellate division opinion).
59 Guttenberg, 85 NJ. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. Specifically, the court addressed
whether a foreclosing mortgagee must comply with the Act to receive an order of
eviction from superior court against tenants whose leases were subordinate to the
mortgage. Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298. In its reasoning, the court pointed to: (1) the
statutory language, (2) the location of the Act within the statutory scheme, (3) the
legislative history, and (4) the legislative silence with respect to established law governing the rights of mortgagees and defaulting mortgagors. Id.
62 Id. at 623-24, 428 A.2d at 1292-93 (citing §§ 2A:18-61.1, -61.2, -61.3, & -61.4)
(quotations omitted). The court insisted that the Legislature would have employed
broader terminology had it intended the Act to apply to a wider range of parties. Id.
at 623, 428 A.2d at 1293. The majority also rejected the defendant's argument that
mortgagees were included within the umbrella of the Act through the use of the word
"owner." Id. at 629-30, 428 A.2d at 1296 (citations omitted). In so doing, Justice
Schreiber narrowly defined an owner as someone "who lease[s] a substantial property, such as an apartment house, to one person who in turn rents the units to tenants." Id. at 629, 428 A.2d at 1296 (citation omitted). The court then stated that the
mortgagee does not become an owner unless the mortgagee purchases the property
at the foreclosure sale. Id. at 630, 428 A.2d at 1296. Consequently, the tenancy is
extinguished at the time of foreclosure. But see id. at 635, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman,
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majority noted that the placement of the Act among other statutes
regulating landlord-tenant relations further evinced the legislative
intent. 63 Next, the supreme court examined the legislative history
of the Act and determined that the Act was directed toward curbing landlords' abusive and arbitrary treatment of tenants, and not
toward protecting tenants from eviction by foreclosing mortgagees. 64 Finally, the majority asserted that the Legislature would not
restrict a mortgagee's rights vis-a-vis a subordinate tenant without
making some reference to mortgagees in the Act.6 5
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's interpretation of the term "owner"). Justice
Pashman highlighted the Act's frequent reference to the word "owner," coupled with
its failure to define "landlord." Id. The statutory language, the Justice opined, suggested that the Act was meant to affect "all persons who had a common law right to
evict a tenant." Id.(citations omitted). Although agreeing that foreclosure extinguishes a lease, Justice Pashman nevertheless insisted that the Act protected the tenants from eviction. Id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman,J., dissenting); see Cornelio,
supranote 16, at 363-64 (criticizing the Guttenbergcourt's treatment of "landlord" and
"owner" as inconsistent with the legislative purpose of protecting the security of residential tenants).
63 Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 624, 428 A.2d at 1293. Moreover, the court explained that
statutes relating to the same subject must be read together. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Noting that the Act amended § 2A:18-53, which authorized summary
eviction of residential tenants, Justice Schreiber proffered that the relationship between § 2A:18-61.1 et seq. and § 2A:18-53 strongly supported the court's holding. Id.
at 624-25, 428 A.2d at 1293.
64 Id. at 625, 626, 428 A.2d at 1293, 1294 (citations omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied on the statement attached to Assembly Bill 1586, a precursor to the Act. See id. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1293-94 (quoting statement accompanying
Assembly Bill 1586 at 4 (1974)). For text of the statement, see supra note 14. In the
dissent, Justice Pashman utilized this statement to buttress the dissent's opinion that
the Act was enacted to protect against arbitrary evictions by any source. See id.at 634,
i]
428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (remarking that "[ t is
obviously of no matter to an evicted tenant if he loses his home, through no fault of
his own, because of arbitrary conduct on the part of his original landlord or because a
mortgagee has foreclosed").
65 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 626, 627, 428 A.2d at 1294, 1295 (concluding that " [i]f
the Legislature had intended to modify these established fundamental property
rights, it would have done so in some straightforward manner") (citations omitted);
see supra note 9 (explaning a foreclosing mortgagee's right to evict a defaulted mortgagor's tenants in possession under leases executed after the mortgage). But see Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority's contention and remarking on the incongruity of allowing a mortgagee to
have a greater right to evict tenants than a landlord) (quotation omitted); Tonrey,
supra note 8, at 1035 n.106 (questioning the court's "technical interpretation" of the
issue and suggesting a broader analysis).
Presenting a common law argument, the tenants asserted that a landlord-tenant
relationship now existed because the tenants had attorned to the mortgagee by their
offer to pay rent. Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 630, 428 A.2d at 1296. The court rejected the
tenant's position. Id. The majority stressed that a mortgagee must be in actual or
constructive possession of the premises and must ask the tenant to pay rent for an
attornment to be valid. Id. (citations omitted). Because Guttenberg had not ac-
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Other jurisdictions have applied statutory eviction restrictions
in situations not involving customary landlord-tenant relationships.66 In Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine,67 the Veterans Administration-the mortgage insurer and owner of the
mortgaged property after the foreclosure sale-sought to evict
Joyce Valentine, the defaulted mortgagor's tenant. 68 The District
cepted the rent, the court reasoned, no attornment had occurred and no landlordtenant relationship existed. Id. at 621, 630, 428 A.2d at 1291, 1296-97.
The majority was also influenced by amici curiae arguments warning that available mortgage funding would decrease if foreclosing mortgagees were required to
establish good cause to evict tenants. Id. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297 (quotation and
citation omitted); see also Kelley A. Baione, Survey, The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act: Eviction Protectionfor the Tenants of a Defaulting MortgagorUnder Administrator
of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 35 CATH. U. L. Rxv. 1133, 1134 n.10 (1986) (reporting that one lending institution withdrew from the District of Columbia mortgage
market after the Valentine court held that mortgagees were subject to statutory eviction restrictions). New Jersey Savings League, the Savings Bank Association of New
Jersey, and Applied Housing Associates of Hoboken, New Jersey intervened as amici
curiae. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 622, 428 A.2d at 1292. The institutions persuaded the
majority that mortgagees should be treated differently than landlords in eviction situations. Id. at 631, 633, 428 A.2d at 1297, 1298 (citations omitted). First, NewJersey
Savings League claimed that preventing mortgagees from freely evicting tenants
would inhibit the mortgagee's ability to collect federal mortgage insurance when federal regulations required that the property be vacant following foreclosure. Id. at 631,
428 A.2d at 1297 (citation omitted). Second, Applied Housing Associates indicated
that institutions would cease lending money for rehabilitation of urban centers because of the financial disincentives connected to renovating occupied housing. Id. at
632, 428 A.2d at 1297. These predictions, coupled with possibilities of locking the
mortgagee into economically disadvantageous leases, convinced the majority that
mortgagees were entitled to different treatment. Id. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298. But see
id. at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that mortgagees
know at the time the mortgage is executed that residential property is likely to be
occupied by tenants).
66 See Boston Rent Equity Bd. v. Dime Say. Bank, 611 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Mass. 1993)
(applying eviction restrictions to a foreclosing mortgagee who purchased residential
premises subject to a rent control ordinance); Administrator of Veterans Affairs v.
Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1166 (D.C. 1985) (applying statutory eviction restrictions to
a mortgage insurer attempting to evict a former mortgagor's tenant); Gross v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284, 291 (Ct. App. 1985) (applying statutory eviction restrictions to a trustee who foreclosed on mortgaged property).
67 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985). For a detailed discussion of the Valentine decision
and its implications, see generally Baione, supra note 65.
68 Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166. At the time of the mortgagor's default, the tenant,
Joyce Valentine, had been renting an apartment on the mortgaged premises for five
years. Id. The mortgagee purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and then
conveyed it to the Veterans Administration (VA), the mortgage insurer. Id. Stating
that it required immediate possession, the VA served Valentine with a 30 day notice to
quit the premises. Id. Valentine refused to relinquish possession, prompting the VA
to file a complaint for possession in superior court. Id. The trial court subsequently
dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the Rental Housing Act. Id.
On appeal, the VA argued that § 45-1561 of the Rental Housing Act did not apply
to the situation. Id. at 1167. Rather, the VA argued that § 45-222 of the District of
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of Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether the eviction restrictions enacted in the Rental Housing Act of 198169 prohibited
the groundless eviction of a defaulting mortgagor's tenant who remained on the property after the foreclosure sale. 70 The court
held that section 45-1561 of the Rental Housing Act, which enumerates the permissible grounds for removing tenants, applied to
the attempted eviction of a former mortgagor's tenant after
foreclosure.7 1
Columbia Code, which treats a mortgagor's tenant as a tenant at will after a foreclosure sale, controlled and permitted the eviction. Id. at 1166-67. Section 45-222 states:
[I] n case of a sale of real estate under mortgage ... and a conveyance
thereof to the purchaser, the grantor in such mortgage ... or those in
possession claiming under him, shall be held and construed to be tenants at will, except in the case of a tenant holding under an unexpired
lease for years, in writing, antedating the mortgage ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-222 (1990). If the foreclosure sale transformed Valentine's interest into a tenancy at will, the VA could end Valentine's tenancy upon 30 days written notice. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1403 (1990) (providing that either party may
terminate a tenancy at will upon 30 days written notice).
69 D.C. Code Ann. §§ 45-1501 to 45-1597 (1990) (repealed 1985). Section 45-1561
stated that no rent-paying tenant could be evicted from the premises, even if the lease
term had expired, unless the landlord could establish one of the nine listed grounds
for eviction. See id. § 45-1561(a). Under the Rental Housing Act, a landlord could
regain possession of the premises when: (b) the tenant violated a condition of the
tenancy; (c) the tenant has engaged in illegal activities on the premises, as determined by a court; (d) the owner intends to immediately and personally use the unit as
a dwelling; (e) the owner has entered into a contract to sell the premises to a buyer
intending to personally use it as a dwelling, provided the tenant has been given the
opportunity to purchase the premises; (f) the landlord intends to immediately engage
in renovation that cannot be undertaken safely while the premises is occupied; (g)
the landlord intends to immediately demolish and subsequently replace the premises;
(h) the landlord intends to engage in an immediate and substantial rehabilitation of
the premises; (i) the landlord, subject to conditions, intends to remove the property
from the rental market; and (j) subject to restrictions, the landlord intends to convert
the premises to a condominium or cooperative unit. See id. § 45-1561 (b)-(j). A tenant could also be evicted for non-payment of rent. See id. § 45-1561 (a); cf. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:18-61.1. See supra note 14 for a list of the grounds for eviction in New
Jersey under the Anti-Eviction Act.
Section 45-1561 was repealed in 1985. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561. Currently,
the District's eviction restrictions are codified in D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2551. See id.
§ 45-2551 (1990). Substantially the same as its predecessor, § 45-2551 replaces the
term "landlord," used in § 45-1561, with the term "housing provider." Compare id.
§ 45-1561 (using the word "landlord") with id. § 45-2551 (using the term "housing
provider"). In the current statute, a "housing provider" is defined as "a landlord, an
owner, lessor, sublessor, assignee, or their agent, or any other person receiving or
entitled to receive rents or benefits for the use or occupancy of any rental unit within
a housing accommodation within the District." Id. § 45-2503(15) (1990); cf id. § 451503(12) (defining "landlord" in substantially the same manner).
70 Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166.
71 Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). For cases applying the Valentine holding, see Merriweather v. D.C. Bldg. Corp., 494 A.2d 1276, 1276 (D.C. 1985) (footnote and citation
omitted) (applying the Valentine holding to extend eviction protection to tenants of
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The court resolved this issue by adopting a liberal interpretation of the statute, thus promoting the underlying legislative intent: tenant protection.7 2 Stressing the need to read statutes in
the context of the legislative scheme, the court refused to limit application of the eviction law by adopting the technical definitions
of "landlord," "tenant," and "rental unit."7 3 The court reasoned
that the purpose of section 45-1561 was to protect tenants who continue to pay rent from eviction, even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the tenant and the present owner.74
Therefore, the court ruled that the eviction restrictions applied to
the eviction of a mortgagor's tenant after a foreclosure sale, superseding earlier statutes that treated a defaulted mortgagor's tenant
75
as a tenant at will.

the mortgagor holding over after foreclosure); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 492 A.2d 279, 280 (D.C. 1985) (applying the Valentine
decision to hold that tenants of a defaulting trust debtor become the tenants of the
purchaser at a trustee sale under the Rental Housing Act).
72 See Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1168 (quotation and citations omitted). But cf Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 627-28, 428 A.2d 1289, 1295 (1981)
(citations omitted) (declining to liberally construe New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act
when adopting such a construction would "distort [the legislative] intent by applying
the statute to an unintended subject").
73 See Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1169-70. The Rental Housing Act defined "landlord" as
an owner, lessor, sublessor, assignee, any agent thereof, or any other person receiving or entitled to receive rents or benefits for the use or occupancy of any rental unit
within a housing accommodation within the District of Columbia.'" Id. at 1169 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1503(12)). "Tenant" was defined as "'a tenant, subtenant,
lessee, sublessee, or other person entitled to the possession, occupancy, or the benefits thereof of any rental unit owned by another person.'" Id. (quoting D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1503(30)). A "rental unit" was "'any part of a housing accommodation ...
which is rented or offered for rent for residential occupancy.'" Id. (quoting D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-1503(27)).
74 Id. at 1168, 1169, 1170 (quotations and citations omitted). Section 45-1561(a)
provides that a "'tenant shall [not] be evicted .. .notwithstanding the expiration of
... [the tenant's] lease.., so long as... [the tenant] continues to pay the rent to
which the landlord is entitled.'" Id. at 1169 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561 (a)).
Furthermore, the court concluded that the phrase "'the rent to which the landlord is
entitled'" merely referred to "the money payable for the use and occupancy of the
particular unit after foreclosure." See id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561(a)). But
cf. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292 (holding that the Anti-Eviction Act is
only applicable to traditional landlord-tenant relationships).
75 Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166-67, 1170 (quotation and citation omitted); see supra
note 68 (discussing D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-222 and 45-1403 which deal with tenancies
at will); see also Baione, supra note 65, at 1149, 1150 (harmonizing the interaction
between §§ 45-222 and 45-1561 of the D.C. Code). But see Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1172
(Terry, A.J., dissenting) (concluding that Valentine was a tenant at will under § 45222). Characterizing § 45-222 "as a preexisting exception" to § 45-1561, Associate
Judge Terry refused to join the majority's attempt to implicitly repeal the statute. Id.
at 1170, 1171, 1172 (Terry, AJ., dissenting). The associate judge further noted that
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Similarly, in Gross v. Superior Court76 a California Court of Appeal extended the application of statutory eviction restrictions beyond the conventional landlord-tenant relationship by focusing on
the initial mortgagor-tenant relationship rather than the relationship between the tenant and the subsequent purchaser.77 In Gross,
Victoria News Consortium, as trustee, foreclosed on property,

purchased it at the trustee sale, and then attempted to remove the
tenant from the premises. 7' The court framed the issue as whether
a purchaser at a trustee sale which occurs after the commencement
of a tenant's lease can evict a tenant from a rent-controlled unit
absent establishing grounds for eviction under the local rent stabilization ordinance.7 9 Stating that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale
was a landlord under the ordinance, the court of appeals ruled that
practice of "repeals by implication" was not in favor. Id. at 1171 (Terry, AJ.,
dissenting).
76 217 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Ct. App. 1985).
77 Id. at 289, 290.
78 Id. at 285. In May, 1979, Victoria News Consortium executed a deed of trust as
part of a condominium sale. Id. The purchasers in that transaction defaulted on the
debt after entering into a one-year lease with the tenant. Id. Victoria News Consortium foreclosed and purchased the premises at the trustee sale in March, 1983. Id.
Relying on California Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a, Victoria News Consortium
notified the tenant that he had three days to vacate the premises. Id.; see CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1161a(3) (West 1982) (stating that a person in possession holding over
after a three-day notice to quit can be removed when "the property has been duly sold
. .. under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by him, or a person
under whom he claims, and the tide under the sale has been duly perfected"). Victoria News Consortium was granted possession and the tenant appealed. Gross, 217 Cal.
Rptr. at 285-86. Victoria News Consortium claimed that as a purchaser at a foreclosure sale, it was not a landlord and therefore not subject to San Francisco's rent stabilization ordinance. Id. at 289.
79 Gross, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 286. The rent stabilization ordinance at issue was
§ 37.9(a) of the San Francisco rent control ordinance. Id. The ordinance states that
a landlord cannot gain possession of the premises unless: (1) the tenant has not paid
rent; (2) the tenant has violated the terms of the tenancy; (3) the tenant has engaged
in a nuisance or has otherwise disrupted enjoyment of other tenants; (4) the tenant is
committing an illegal act in the premises; (5) after expiration of the current lease, the
tenant has not agreed to a similar agreement; (6) the tenant has denied the landlord
access to the premises; (7) the landlord has not approved the subtenant in possession;
(8) the landlord, or his family, intends to reside in the premises; (9) the landlord
intends to sell the premises as a condominium; (10) the landlord intends to demolish
the premises; (11) the landlord intends to temporarily withdraw the premises from
the residential market in order to conduct renovations; (12) the landlord intends to
engage in significant rehabilitation work; (13) the landlord, unable to evict a tenant
under this section, wants to cease renting an entire detached physical structure and
has complied with § 37.9A. SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., ADMIN. CODE Vol. 3, § 37.9(a)
(1994). Compare id. (enumerating permitted grounds for eviction in San Francisco)
with NJ STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (listing permitted grounds for eviction in NewJersey)
and D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1561 (identifying the circumstances under which a tenant
could be evicted in the District of Columbia).
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a purchaser must establish good cause to evict a tenant in possession prior to the sale.8"
Interpreting the statutory definition of landlord, the court
first noted that as a "successor" to the owner, a purchaser of property becomes a landlord under the law. 81 Next, the court proffered
that nothing in the language of the ordinance indicated that purchasers at a foreclosure sale were to be characterized differently
than other purchasers of property.82 Because purchasers at foreclosure sales become landlords under the rent control ordinance,
the court continued, purchasers must comply with its provisions
despite the absence of a formal landlord-tenant relationship. 8
The court therefore concluded that failure to establish permitted
grounds for eviction constituted a valid defense to an unlawful detainer action brought by the purchaser.'
Massachusetts courts have likewise rejected a literal construction of municipal eviction restrictions with regard to foreclosing
mortgagees. 85 In Boston Rent Equity Board v. Dime Savings Bank,86

Dime Savings Bank (Dime), as mortgagee, sought to evict the mortgagor's tenant after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. 7
The Boston Rent Equity Board sought to prohibit Dime from evict80 Gross, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 289, 291. The ordinance defined "landlord" as an
.owner, lessor, sublessor, who receives or is entitled to receive rent for the use and
occupancy of any residential rental unit or portion thereof in the City and County of
San Francisco, and the agent, representative or successor of any of the foregoing."
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE Vol. 3, § 37.2(h) (1994).
81 Gross, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
82 Id. at 289, 290.
83 Id. at 289. The court explained that the ordinance did not mandate that the
current parties initiate the landlord-tenant relationship for the ordinance to be applicable. Id. That is, once a landlord-tenant relationship has been established, parties
succeeding to the landlord's interest must establish lawful grounds for eviction under
the ordinance. Id. at 289, 291.
84 Id. at 291. California Civil Procedure Code § 1161a establishes the circumstances under which an unlawful detainer action may be brought. See CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE § 1161a (West 1982). For pertinent text of § 1161a, see supra note 78. The
court explained that § 1161a was a procedural statute establishing a method by which
certain purchasers could recover possession. Gross, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (quotation
and citation omitted). As a result, the court pronounced that this section did not
preempt the application of the rent stabilization ordinance. Id. The ordinance was
applicable, the court posited, because it represented a substantive modification of an
owner's property rights which restricted the circumstances under an owner was entitled to the procedural remedy provided by the Code. Id. at 287-88.
85 Boston Rent Equity Bd. v. Dime Say. Bank, 611 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Mass. 1993)
(quotation omitted).
86 611 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1993).
87 Id. at 246. Dime followed a policy of evicting any tenant who did not vacate the
premises after Dime had foreclosed on the landlord's mortgage and purchased the
premises. Id.
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ing the tenant without complying with the rent control ordinance."8 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts questioned
whether a mortgagee that has foreclosed on a rent-controlled residential premises must apply for a certificate of eviction before acting to remove the mortgagor's tenant.8 9 Reasoning that Dime was
the landlord of a controlled housing accommodation, the court
held that the bank must apply for a certificate of eviction prior to
removal.90
The court first acknowledged that a literal reading of the ordinance would determine that the tenant's unit was not a housing
accommodation because the premises had not been rented or of92
fered for rent.9" Based upon the objectives of the ordinance,
however, Justice Wilkins rejected a literal reading and asserted that
88 Id. at 246-47. The ordinance at issue in Boston Rent Equity Board was a Boston
rent ordinance which enumerated the instances in which a landlord could evict a
tenant. Id. at 247 (citing BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 10-2.9 (1988)). In order for a tenant
to be evicted, the Boston Rent Equity Board must first issue a certificate of eviction.
See id. The Board may issue the certificate to the landlord under the following circumstances: (1) the tenant has not paid rent; (2) the tenant has violated a condition
of the tenancy; (3) the tenant has engaged in destructive behavior or has created a
nuisance in the premises; (4) the tenant has engaged in illegal acts in the premises;
(5) the tenant has refused to renew the lease under similar terms; (6) the tenant has
denied reasonable access to the landlord; (7) the tenant in possession was an unapproved subtenant; (8) the landlord intends to personally occupy the premises; (9) the
landlord intends to demolish the structure; (10) a reason not conflicting with the law
justifies eviction. BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 10-2.9. Compare id. with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.1 (listing permitted grounds for eviction in New Jersey) and D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1561 (setting forth grounds for eviction in the District of Columbia) and
SAN FRANcisco, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.9(a) (1994) (enumerating permissible
grounds for eviction in San Francisco). Once a landlord has obtained the certificate,
he can bring a summary process action against the tenant to regain possession. See
Boston Rent Equity Bd., 611 N.E.2d at 247, 248.
89 Boston Rent Equity Bd., 611 N.E.2d at 247.
90 Id. at 248. To reach this conclusion, the court interpreted three sections of the
Boston rent control ordinance. Id. at 247-48 (quotations and citations omitted). Section 10-2.9(a) of the ordinance states: "'[a] landlord seeking to recover possession of
a controlled or vacancy decontrolled housing accommodation shall apply to the
Board for a certificate of eviction."' Id. at 247 (quoting BOSTON, MAss., CODE § 102.9(a)). Section 10-2.1 defines "landlord" as "'the individual who holds title to any
controlled housing accommodation or decontrolled housing accommodation in any
manner, including without limitation, a . . . corporation.'" Id. (quoting BOSTON,
MASS., CODE § 10-2.1). Section 10-2.1 defines "housing accommodation" as "'any
building, structure or part thereof or land appurtenant thereto, or any other real or
personal property rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling purposes, within the
city.'" Id. at 247-48 (quoting BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 10-2.1).
91 Id. at 248. In its decision, the court focused on the phrase "rented or offered
for rent" taken from the definition of "housing accommodation." Id. at 247-48.
92 For a discussion of the purposes of the rent control ordinance, see Cornelio,
supra note 16, at 364-65 (stating that the purpose of the ordinance was to safeguard
existing residential housing).
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the premises was a housing accomodation because it would be "offered for rent" in the future.13 Consequently, the court declared
that as the landlord, Dime must obtain a certificate of eviction
before instituting eviction proceedings.9 4
After the New Jersey Legislature amended the Anti-Eviction
Act in 1986, the Supreme Court of New Jersey again considered
whether the Act was intended to apply outside the conventional
landlord-tenant relationship.9 5 In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson,9 6 the supreme court considered whether section 2A:1861.3(b), 97 which subjects an "owner's or landlord's successor in
ownership or possession" to the Act's "good cause" eviction restraints, applied to foreclosing mortgagees.9 8 Ultimately, the court
held that the amended Act applied to foreclosing mortgagees,
preventing such mortgagees from evicting tenants without cause. 99
Before examining the impact of the 1986 amendments, Justice
Stein, writing for the majority, proffered that Chase was subject to
the provisions of the Act because the Josephsons' tenancy predated
the mortgage. 10 0 Noting that the reasoning employed in Guttenberg
pertained solely to situations in which the mortgage antedated the
tenancy, 10 1 the court concluded that Chase became the Joseph93 Boston Rent Equity Bd., 611 N.E.2d at 248. Dime admitted that it expected the
next owner of the property to lease the unit. Id.
94 Id.; see also Cornelio, supra note 16, at 365 (concluding that since the ordinance
states that "no person" can obtain possession without a certificate, the statutory language was broad enough to encompass foreclosing mortgagees).
95 See Chase Manhattan Bank v.Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 213, 638 A.2d 1301, 1303
(1994).
96 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994).
97 For the text of § 2A:18-61.3(b), see supra note 15.
98 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 213, 638 A.2d at 1303. In Guttenberg, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that the Act, as originally enacted, did not
cover the actions of foreclosing mortgagees. Guttenberg Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera,
85 N.J. 617, 623, 428 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1981).
99 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314. The court stated that
this decision superseded the conclusion reached in Guttenberg. Id.; see Guttenberg, 85
N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292.
100 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 224, 638 A.2d at 1308.
101 Id. at 223, 638 A.2d at 1308. The Guttenberg court emphasized that a default and
foreclosure of a prior mortgage extinguished any tenancy entered into subsequent to
the mortgage. See Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 626-27, 428 A.2d at 1294-95 (citations omitted). Since the foreclosure terminated the tenancy, the court explained, the mortgagee could not be a landlord and could not be constrained by the Act. See id. at 623,
630, 428 A.2d at 1292, 1296.
The Chase court observed that a tenancy created prior to a mortgage would not
be extinguished by a default and foreclosure since the mortgage would constitute the
subordinate interest. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 223, 638 A.2d at 1308. In this
case, the mortgagee would become the tenant's landlord and, as such, would have to
comply with the requirements of the Act. Id. at 223, 224, 638 A.2d at 1308. See supra
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sons' landlord upon the mortgagor's default. 10 2 Consequently, the
court reasoned, the original version of the Act prevented Chase, as
03
landlord, from evicting the Josephsons without good cause.1
The supreme court began its examination of the 1986 amendments' impact on mortgagees by analyzing the plain language of
the amended Act.'0 4 First, the court analyzed the statute's prohibition that prevents a party succeeding to the landlord's or owner's
possessory interest from removing a tenant by virtue of an order
for possession.' 5 Justice Stein determined that this prohibition applied to foreclosing mortgagees because the mortgagee, who is entitled to take possession after the mortgagor defaults, is required to
obtain such an order before taking possession. 10 6 The majority
then studied the Act's applicability to a party succeeding to an
owner's or landlord's ownership interest. 0 7 Remarking that a purnote 9 for a general discussion of the mortgagee's common law rights when the mortgage predated and postdated the interest of the tenant.
102 ChaseManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 223, 224, 638 A.2d at 1308. The court characterized the Josephsons' periodic tenancy as a "continuing relationship" which commenced in 1978, nine years before the mortgage was executed. Id. at 224, 638 A.2d at
1308 (quoting Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 89 N.J. 576, 583, 446
A.2d 862, 865 (1982)) (other citation omitted). As the court stated in Harry's Village,
Inc., a month-to-month tenancy continues according to its original terms until one of
the parties ends the relationship. Harry's Village, Inc., 89 N.J. at 583, 446 A.2d at 865.
Because the Josephsons' tenancy remained in continual effect despite its month-tomonth term, the court concluded that Chase's possessory interest was subject to the
prior tenancy. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 224, 638 A.2d at 1308.
103 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 214, 224, 638 A.2d at 1303, 1308.
104 Id. at 225, 638 A.2d at 1309 (citation omitted). The court explained that if the
meaning of the language is dear and there is no specific evidence of a contrary legislative intent, the court will implement that meaning. Id. (quotation omitted); accord
G.E. Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307, 625 A.2d 468, 472
(1993) (quotation and other citations omitted) (directing that if the statutory language can only be interpreted one way, that meaning controls unless it contradicts
the legislative intent); Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610, 592
A.2d 216, 219 (1991) (citation omitted) (stating that principles of statutory construction require the court to first consider the plain language of the statute unless the
Legislature has specifically indicated a contrary intention).
105 ChaseManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 225-26, 638 A.2d at 1309 (quotation omitted).
106 Id. The court noted that a mortgagee has two methods by which to obtain an
order for possession from superior court. Id. First, the court stated that the mortgagee can pursue an action for possession in superior court for an order of possession
pursuant to New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 2A:35-1. Id. at 225, 638 A.2d at 1309.
Section 2A.35-1 provides that "[a]ny person claiming the right of possession of real
property in the possession of another.., shall be entitled to have his rights determined in an action in the superior court." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994). Alternatively, the court stated, the mortgagee can seek possession as
part of the foreclosure proceedings. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 225, 638 A.2d
at 1309.
107 See Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 226, 638 A.2d at 1309 (quotations and
citations omitted).

1314

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:1292

chaser at a foreclosure sale becomes the mortgagor's successor in
ownership, the court opined that the Act clearly pertained to mortgagees who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. 10 8
Next, the court bolstered its conclusion that foreclosing mortgagees were subject to the Act by highlighting the correlation between the court's interpretation and the Act's primary purpose. 0 9
Underscoring the legislative aim to protect innocent tenants, the
majority stressed that in a default situation, the mortgagor's tenant

108 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Emphasizing this point, Justice Stein
pronounced that "the Act, read literally, applies to mortgagees." Id.
109 See id. (citation omitted). The Legislature expressed its intent to protect tenants
from arbitrary evictions during a housing shortage in a statement attached to Assembly Bill A-1586, a precursor to the Act. 447 Assocs. v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 527, 559
A.2d 1362, 1364 (1989) (quotation and citation omitted). For the text of the statement, see supra note 14. See also A.P. Dev. Corp. v. Band, 113 N.J. 485, 492, 550 A.2d
1220, 1224 (1988) (stating that the legislative purpose was to limit evictions because
of a severe housing shortage in New Jersey); Montgomery Gateway East I v. Herrera,
261 N.J. Super. 235, 241, 618 A.2d 865, 868 (App. Div. 1992) (citations omitted)
(commenting that the Act was intended to protect tenants from the state's housing
shortage by requiring good cause to evict); Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567,
572, 342 A.2d 529, 531 (App. Div. 1975) (quotation and citation omitted) (concluding that the purpose of the Act was to limit evictions during a housing shortage).
The overall purpose of the Act should be compared with the more specific purpose of the 1986 amendments. See § 2A:18-61.1a (reporting the legislative finding
that "pretexts" and "stratagems" have been employed to circumvent eviction restrictions to convert property to more profitable uses); Assembly Housing Committee
Statement to Assembly Bill A-1840 at 1 (1986) (stating that the bill would prevent
owners and landlords from employing pretexts to evict tenants to facilitate conversion
to high rent units, cooperatives, and condominiums); Senate Labor, Industry and Professions Committee, Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for S-1912 and A-1840
at 1 (1986) (stating that the bill would address the abuses evicted tenants suffer when
they are removed because the landlord seeks to demolish the premises, to permanently board it up, or to permanently retire it from residential use and then subsequently resumes residential use of the premises); Statement attached to Senate Bill S1912 at 5 (1986) (defining the purpose of the bill as a means to prevent the use of
pretexts to evict tenants). In addition to targeting the specific purpose of reducing
pretextual evictions, the Legislature also declared that the Act and the 1986 amendments should be liberally construed. See § 2A:18-61.2 (historical note).
The broad purpose of protecting blameless tenants from arbitrary evictions during a housing shortage was also a motivating factor in the passage of statutory eviction
restrictions in other states. See Cornelio, supra note 16, at 364 (quotations omitted)
(explaining that Boston's Rental Housing Equity Ordinance was passed in response to
a serious housing shortage and was intended to prevent arbitrary evictions without
good cause); Baione, supra note 65, at 1133 (characterizing the District of Columbia
Rental Housing Act as being part of an ongoing attempt to alleviate the housing
shortage by imposing eviction controls). In these jurisdictions, mortgagees are required to comply with statutory eviction restrictions. See Boston Rent Equity Bd. v.
Dime Sav. Bank, 611 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Mass. 1993); Administrator of Veterans Affairs
v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1166, (D.C. 1985); Gross v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr.
284, 286, 291 (Ct. App. 1985).
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is blameless. 110 Consequently, the court proffered that extending
the Act to protect innocent tenants from eviction by foreclosing
mortgagees furthered the overall legislative purpose behind the
11
Act. 1
Justice Stein further noted that the 1986 amendments addressed concerns raised by the Guttenbergcourt, indicating the Legislature's decision to supersede that case." 2 Illustrating, the
majority declared that the added prohibition barring successors in
110 See Chase ManhattanBank, 135 NJ. at 226, 638 A.2d at 1309-10 (quotation and
other citations omitted).
111 Id.; see Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1009-10 (concluding that interpreting the 1986
amendments to include foreclosing mortgagees would be consistent with the legislative intent); Cornelio, supra note 16, at 363-64 (remarking that because the focus of
the Act is adequate housing, foreclosing mortgagees should be prohibited from arbitrarily evicting tenants).
In support of this view, the court remarked that tenants should not have to "confront the devastating effects of eviction... merely because they had rented property
from landlords that were either unwilling or unable to meet their mortgage obligations." Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 226, 638 A.2d at 1310. When enacting the
1986 amendments to the Act, the New Jersey Legislature acknowledged the personal
and communal hardship caused by residential evictions. See § 2A:18-61.la(a) (stating
the Legislature's findings regarding the impact of residential evictions). The Legislature codified its findings in § 2A:18-61.1a of the Act, which states in pertinent part:
d. It is in the public interest of the State to maintain for citizens the
broadest protections available under State eviction laws to avoid such
displacement and resultant loss of affordable housing, which, due to
housing's uniqueness as the most costly and difficult to change necessity
of life, causes overcrowding, unsafe and unsanitary conditions, blight,
burdens on community services, wasted resources, homelessness, emigration from the State and personal hardship ....
e. Such personal hardship includes... economic loss, time loss, physical
and emotional stress, and in some cases severe emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting from strain of
eviction controversy; relocation search and moving difficulties; anxiety
caused by lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; employment, education, family and social disruption; relocation
and empty unit security hazards; relocation to premises of less affordability, capacity, accessibility and physical or environmental quality;
and relocation adjustment problems ....
Id.
112 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 227, 228, 638 A.2d at 1310 (quotations and
citations omitted). As a principle of statutory construction, courts assume that the
Legislature is familiar with the statutes it enacts and with the interpretations accorded
them by the courts. Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174, 249 A.2d 388, 391 (1969)
(citations omitted); County of Essex v. Commissioner, N.J. Dep't of Human Services,
252 N.J. Super. 1, 10-11, 599 A.2d 167, 172 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
127 NJ. 553, 606 A.2d 366 (1991). Therefore, the Chase court stated, when the Legislature specifically deals with issues raised by the court that interpreted the statute in a
later amendment, that acknowledgment of the judicial opinion evidences the Legislature's consideration of the court's views. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 227, 638
A.2d at 1310 (citation omitted).
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possession from evicting tenants constituted a direct legislative response to the Guttenberg court's determination that a mortgagee
was entitled to possession upon default."1 Additionally, the court
stated that the words "a person who was a tenant of a landlord"
implicitly removed any requirement that a formal landlord-tenant
relationship exist.1 4 The majority thus nullified Guttenberg's argument that mortgagees are not subject to the Act because they are
1
not landlords.

15

Furthermore, Justice Stein observed that the Legislature's
changes to section 2A:18-61.3 resolved the practical problems that
the Guttenberg court feared would result from subjecting mortgagees to restrictions in the Act.116 By creating an exception to the
anti-eviction provisions for situations controlled by federal law, 7
the majority noted, the amendment removed the Act's previous
conflict with federal regulations which mandated that property secured by federally-insured mortgages be returned to the insurer
unoccupied. 1 8 Addressing the Guttenberg court's reluctance to
113 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 227, 638 A.2d at 1310 (quotations and citation
omitted). Compare Guttenberg Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 626-27, 428
A.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1981) (citations omitted) (explaining that upon the mortgagor's
default, the mortgagee could foreclose and obtain possession from the mortgagor's
tenant if the mortgage preceded the lease) with § 2A:18-61.3(b) (stating that "[a] person who was a tenant of a landlord... may not be removed by any order orjudgment
for possession... by the owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession").
114 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310 (quoting § 2A1861.3(b)). The court explained that foreclosure proceedings terminate any tenancies
entered into subsequent to the mortgage. See id. at 220, 638 A.2d at 1306 (citation
omitted). As a result, no landlord-tenant relationship exists between the purchaser at
a foreclosure sale and the mortgagor's tenant. See Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 630, 428 A.2d
at 1296. This lack of a relationship between the parties convinced the Guttenberg court
that despite the Act's reference to "owners," the Act did not apply to mortgagees
purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. See id. In agreement, the Chase court
acknowledged that § 2A:18-61.3(b) reflects both that the party in possession is no
longer a tenant and that there is no relationship between the mortgagor's tenant and
the mortgagee. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 227, 638 A.2d at 1310 (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, the court asserted that § 2A.l8-61.3(b) remedied this problem by prohibiting a landlord's or owner's successor in interest from removing a person "who was a tenant of a landlord ...... Id. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310 (quoting
§ 2A:18-61.3(b)).
115 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 227-28, 638 A.2d at 1310.
116 Id. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310.
117 See § 2A:18-61.3(b) (2) (stating that the landlord's or owner's successor could
not remove the landlord's tenant except "Iflor proceedings . . .where federal law
supersedes applicable State law governing removal of occupants").
118 Id. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310 (citations omitted). In Guttenberg, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey voiced concern that if foreclosing mortgagees were not allowed
to evict tenants, the mortgagee would be unable to comply with federal vacancy requirements. Guttenberg,85 NJ. at 631,428 A.2d at 1297 (citation omitted). The mortgagee would therefore be unable to collect the mortgage insurance proceeds after
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bind mortgagees to improvident leases negotiated by the mortgagor," 9 the court explained that the final paragraph of section
2A:18-61.3 permits a mortgagee who is not bound by the original
lease to negotiate a new lease with more acceptable terms, including rent increases.12 0 If the tenant refuses the new terms, the majority remarked, the mortgagee then has grounds to evict the
1
tenant.

12

Finally, Justice Stein responded to the Guttenberg court's concern that prohibiting mortgagees from evicting tenants would discourage lending to rehabilitative housing and encourage
default. Id. The result, the court feared, would lead to a reduction in the amount of
available mortgage funds. Id.
The Guttenberg court premised its concerns on the requirements of § 203.381 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. (citation omitted). Section 203.381 states that
"[t]he mortgagee shall certify that the property is vacant and contains no personal
property as of the date of filing for record of the deed to the Secretary or that the
Secretary has consented to accept the property occupied." 24 C.F.R. § 203.381
(1992). Prior to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Chase Manhattan
Bank, however, an exception to the vacancy requirement was created in § 203.670 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, allowing the mortgagee to convey occupied property if state law prohibited the eviction of rent-paying tenants by the mortgagee. See
24 C.F.R. § 203.670(b) (2) (1992) (stating that under certain circumstances, the "Secretary will accept conveyance of an occupied property ... if the Secretary finds that
... State or local law prohibits the mortgagee from evicting a tenant residing in the
property who is making regular monthly payments to the mortgagor"). The Chase
court conceded that § 203.670 had already eliminated the conflict discovered in Guttenberg. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 221, 228, 638 A.2d at 1307, 1310 (citation
omitted). The court nevertheless concluded that the inclusion of § 2A:18-61.3(b) (2)
in the 1986 amendments reflected the Legislature's intent to address the concerns
raised in Guttenberg. Id. at 221, 228.
119 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310 (citing Guttenberg, 85
NJ. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1298). The Guttenbergmajority expressed concern at the possibility that the mortgagor would be forced to accept leases containing provisions benefiting the mortgagor but detrimental to the mortgagee over the long term. Guttenberg,
85 N.J. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1298.
120 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 228, 229, 638 A.2d at 1310-11 (citations omitted). The mortgagee would not be bound by the existing lease if the lease was executed after the mortgage was in place. Id. at 228, 638 A.2d at 1310-11; see supra note 9
(discussing those circumstances in which the mortgagee would not be bound by the
tenant's lease after the mortgagor defaults). But see Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at
238, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for treating
the opportunity to enter into a new lease as a "cure-all or panacea" and illustrating the
difficulties that can arise when the tenant in possession does not have a lease).
121 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 229, 638 A.2d at 1311 (citation omitted). The
Act permits the eviction of tenants who fail to pay valid, not unconscionable, rent
increases or who refuse to accept reasonable changes in the lease terms. See § 2A.1861.1(f) (stating that a person can be evicted for failing to pay "not unconscionable"
rent increases which comply with applicable rent control laws and which have been
accompanied by a valid notice of the increase); § 2A-18-61.1 (i) (providing, with qualifications, that the tenant can be evicted for refusing "reasonable" changes in the lease
proposed by the owner or landlord).

1318

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

mortgagees to reduce services. 2

[Vol. 25:1292

Outlining the interaction of sev-

eral provisions of the Act, 2 ' the justice concluded that a mortgagee could legally evict tenants occupying deteriorating housing,
rehabilitate the premises, and return it to residential use without
consequence."4 Therefore, the court stated, mortgagees could
continue to provide funds for rehabilitation projects without extra
1 25
risk under the Act.
Having demonstrated that the 1986 amendments alleviated
the concerns raised by the Guttenberg decision, the majority proceeded to further buttress its holding. 12 6 Examining the Act's exemptions for purchasers at a foreclosure sales, the court
pronounced that these exceptions demonstrated the Legislature's
belief that foreclosing mortgagees were subject to other sections of
the Act. 127 Specifically, Justice Stein emphasized that although the
122 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 229, 638 A.2d at 1311 (citing Guttenberg, 85
N.J. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1297). Before addressing the substantive aspects of the issue,
the majority expressed their disdain for the possibility that mortgagees would allow a
building to become uninhabitable in an effort to force the tenants to abandon the
premises. See id. Justice Stein declared that the court would not allow the threatened
use of such a strategy to influence the court's decision. Id.
123 Id. at 229-30, 638 A.2d at 1311. In developing this aspect of its decision, the
court referenced four provisions of the Act. See id. (referring to §§ 2A:18-61.1 (g) (1), 61.3(b)(1), -61.6(c), & -61.6(e)). Section 2A:18-61.1(g)(1) allows the tenant to be
evicted when the owner intends to board up or demolish the building because it is too
costly to correct cited housing code violations. § 2A:18-61.1(g)(1). Section 2A:1861.3(b) (1) permits the "owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession"
to remove the tenant on the basis of the grounds specified in § 2A:18-61.1. § 2A:1861.3(b) (1). Section 2A:18-61.6(c) imposes treble damages on an owner who returns
the premises to residential use within five years of evicting a tenant pursuant to
§ 2A:18-61.1(g)(1). § 2A:18-61.6(c). Section 2A:18-61.6(e) provides that a purchaser
at a foredosure sale is not liable for damages imposed under § 2A:18-61.6(c) if the
purchaser notifies the evicted tenant of the resumption of residential use. § 2A:1861.6(e).
124 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 229-30, 638 A.2d at 1311 (citations omitted).
The court explained that as a successor in interest pursuant to § 2A:18-61.3(b), a
foreclosing mortgagee could evict tenants based upon the dilapidated condition of
the property. Id. (citing §§ 2A:18-61.3(b) (1), -61.1(g)(1)). The court then observed
that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale could prematurely return the premises to residential use without liability, provided the purchaser notifies the former tenants. Id. at
230, 638 A.2d at 1311 (citing § 2A:18-61.6(c), (e)(4)).
125 Id.
126 See id., 638 A.2d at 1312.
127 Id. at 230-31, 232, 638 A.2d at 1312 (quotations and citations omitted). The
court concluded that these provisions primarily applied to foreclosing mortgagees
because mortgagees generally purchase the mortgaged property at the foreclosure
sale. Id. at 230-31, 638 A.2d at 1312 (citing Carteret Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Davis, 105
N.J. 344, 351, 521 A.2d 831, 835 (1987)). The Carteret court referred to a ten-year
study indicating that in 89% of the foreclosure sales in one county, the foreclosing
mortgagee purchased the property for a nominal amount. Carteret Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
105 N.J. at 351, 521 A.2d at 835. The Chasecourt reasoned that by specifically exempt-
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1986 amendments exempted those buying property at a foreclo-

sure sale from treble-damage liability for pretextual evictions, the
amendments did not exempt such purchasers from treble-damage
liability for evictions without cause.12 Additionally, the court proffered that specific exemptions for foreclosing mortgagees contained in recent amendments to the Act reaffirmed the conclusion
that the Legislature intended the Act to apply to such
mortgagees. 129
Concluding its analysis, the supreme court declared that extending the scope of the Act to include foreclosing mortgagees did
not unconstitutionally impair the mortgagees' contract or property
ing mortgagees from certain provisions, the Legislature considered the effect the Act
has on mortgagees and modified that effect where appropriate. See Chase Manhattan
Bank, 135 N.J. at 232, 638 A.2d at 1312.
128 Id. at 230, 231, 638 A.2d at 1312 (citations omitted). In constructing this rationale, the court considered four statutory provisions. Id. at 230, 231, 232, 638 A.2d at
1312 (referring to §§ 2A:18-61.3(b), -61.6(c), -61.6(d) & -61.6(e)). Analyzing the antieviction provisions first, the court observed that § 2A:18-61.3(b) prohibited the landlord or the "owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession" from evicting
a tenant without cause. Id. at 230, 638 A.2d at 1311 (quoting § 2A:18-61.3(b)). The
court noted that an "owner" who attempts to evict a tenant without cause is subject to
treble-damage liability. Id.; see also § 2A:18-61.6(d) (defining "owner" as including
"lessee [s], successor owner[s] and lessee [s], and other successors in interest."). Next,
the court noted that both "owners" and their successors prematurely returning property to residential use, were subject to treble-damage liability. See Chase Manhattan
Bank, 135 N.J. at 230, 638 A.2d at 1312 (interpreting § 2A:18-61.6(c)). Significantly,
the court insisted, the statute exempted purchasers at foreclosure sales from liability
under § 2A:18-61.6(c) but failed to grant a similar exemption from liability under
§ 2A:18-61.6(d). See id. at 230, 231, 638 A.2d at 1312; see also § 2A:18-61.6(e) (providing that purchasers at foreclosure sales are exempt from liability for prematurely returning the property to residential use). Mentioning that mortgagees typically
purchase the property at foreclosure sales, the majority reasoned that the Legislature
understood the various references to owners and successors to include foreclosing
mortgagees. See Chase ManhattanBank, 135 NJ. at 230, 231, 638 A.2d at 1312. The
court therefore concluded that the Legislature intended to include mortgagees
within the scope of the anti-eviction provisions. Id.
129 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 231, 232, 638 A.2d at 1312 (concluding that
an exemption for foreclosing mortgagees in certain circumstances would be unnecessary unless the remainder of the Act applies to mortgagees). The court referred to
§§ 2A:18-61.1g and -61.1h. Id. at 231, 628 A.2d at 1312. Both sections, enacted in
1993, address the circumstances under which an "owner" is responsible for the relocation costs of an evicted tenant. See §§ 2A:18-61.1g & -61.1h. For example, § 2A:1861.1g authorizes a municipality to pass an ordinance holding the owner of the structure responsible for the relocation costs of tenants evicted because of zoning or housing code violations. § 2A:18-61.1g. Likewise, § 2A:18-61.lh requires that the owner
pay the tenant's relocation costs even though the municipality has not passed the
ordinance authorized in § 2A:18-61.1g. § 2A:18-61.1h. Both sections conclude with
the provision that "[f]or the purposes of this section, the owner of a structure shall
exclude mortgagees in possession of a structure through foreclosure." §§ 2A-1861.lg(d) & -61.1h(e).
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rights.1 30 The court commented that it is within the state's police
power to enact statutes that reasonably compromise individual
property rights if they promote a substantial public interest. 131 In
this case, the court reasoned, the public interest in curtailing the
eviction of innocent tenants during a continuing housing shortage
outweighed the potential impact on resale values that might result
from requiring foreclosing mortgagees to comply with the Act." 2
Similarly, the majority concluded that the Act did not significantly
impair the mortgagee's contractual rights because the Act was reasonably related to the permissible purpose of protecting tenants.'1 3
130 ChaseManhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 232, 233, 638 A.2d at 1313 (citations omitted).
Evaluating the application of the Act under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions, the court ruled that the Act did not violate the Contract Clause or the Due
Process Clause of either constitution. Id. at 233, 638 A.2d at 1313 (citing U.S. CONsT.
art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONsr. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § 7, para. 3; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 1).
131 Id. (quotations omitted). Specifically, the court noted that "'[r ] estrictions on
the use of property, if in furtherance of a valid governmental purpose, serve the public interest and are considered a proper exercise of the police power even though
they may result in some economic disadvantage.'" Id. (quoting New Jersey Ass'n of
Health Care Facilities v. Finley (In re Review of Admin. Promulgation of the Health
Care Admin. Bd.), 83 N.J. 67, 81, 415 A.2d 1147, 1154, appeal dismissed and cert. denied
sub nor. Wayne Haven Nursing Home v. Finley, 449 U.S. 944 (1980)) (other citations
omitted). As long as the restrictions are reasonable and promote the public welfare,
the court explained, the statute is permissible. Id. (citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,
561, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (1980) (stating that "private property may be subjected by the
state ... to reasonable restrictions upon its use in order to serve the public welfare"),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982)). Therefore,
the court concluded, a statute can constitutionally be enforced when the public interest served "clearly outweighs the impairment" caused by its enforcement. Id. (citing
State Dep't.of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 499, 468 A.2d 150, 163
(1983)) (finding that when the need to protect the public interest clearly outweighs
the impairment of individual rights, the statute is constitutional) (other citation
omitted).
132 Id. at 234, 638 A.2d at 1313 (citation omitted). As some commentators have
remarked, prohibiting mortgagees from evicting tenants reduces the value of the
mortgaged property, thereby impairing the security given in exchange for the mortgage loan. See Hensel, supra note 9, at 325 (arguing that applying the Act to foreclosing mortgagees would prejudice the mortgagee because the value of the property as
security for the mortgage debt would decrease with the market value of the property if
occupied).
'33 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 234-35, 638 A.2d at 1313-14 (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Chase court adopted the impairment of contract analysis set forth in Edgewater Investment Associates v. Borough of Edgewater. Id.
(citing Edgewater Inv. Assocs. v. Borough of Edgewater, 103 N.J. 227, 232-33, 510 A.2d
1178, 1181-82 (1986)). In Edgewater Investment Associates, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey considered whether the Senior Citizen and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act
unconstitutionally impaired the contract rights of landlords. Edgewater Inv. Assocs.,
103 N.J. at 231, 232, 233, 510 A.2d at 1180, 1181 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:1861.22 to -61.39 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994)). The Senior Citizen and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act grants protected tenancy status to qualifying senior citizen and
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Thus, reversing the appellate division, the Supreme Court of
NewJersey held that section 2A:18-61.3(b) rendered the Anti-Eviction Act applicable to foreclosing mortgagees and that the amendment superseded the decision in Guttenberg.'3 4 Elaborating, the
majority further pronounced that the Act applied to foreclosing
mortgagees regardless of whether the tenancy arose before or after
the creation of the mortgage.1 3 5 Finally, reasoning that holding
mortgagees responsible for past evictions would be unjust, the majority announced that its decision would be applied prospectively
6
13

only.

disabled tenants, insulating them from eviction for a 40 year period. See § 2A:18-61.25
(stating that qualifying senior citizen and disabled tenants will be granted protected
tenancy status); § 2A:18-61.23 (containing the Legislature's declaration that qualifying tenants should be protected from eviction for a period of 40 years). Relying on
the appellate division's analysis, the supreme court held that the statute did not unconstitutionally impair the contract rights of owners of rental property. Edgewater Inv.
Assocs., 103 N.J. at 233-34, 510 A.2d at 1181-82.
To evaluate the constitutionality of the Senior Citizen and Disabled Protected
Tenancy Act, the appellate division applied the three-part analysis set forth in Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. Edgewater Inv. Assocs. v. Borough of
Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super. 267, 278, 493 A.2d 11, 16-17 (App. Div. 1985), affid, 103
N.J. 227, 510 A.2d 1178 (1986) (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983)). The analysis requires a determination of
whether the statute has substantially impaired the complainant's contract rights,
whether "a significant and legitimate public purpose" underlies the statute, and
whether the statute is sufficiently related to achieving that purpose. See Energy Reserves
Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 411, 412 (quotations and citations omitted). Initially, the appellate division reasoned that this statute did not substantially impair the owner's contract rights because the Act merely enlarged the rights that NewJersey has historically
afforded tenants. Edgewater Inv. Assocs., 201 N.J. Super. at 278, 279, 493 A.2d at 17
(citations omitted). Furthermore, even assuming that a substantial impairment of
rights had occurred, the court concluded that the statute was constitutional because
the Act was an effective means of safeguarding the well-being of elderly and disabled
tenants. Id. at 279, 493 A.2d at 17; see § 2A:18-61.23 (commenting on the detrimental
effect that forced eviction of elderly tenants has on the dislocated tenant and on the
community).
134 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314; see also Tonrey, supra
note 8, at 1042 (concluding that as amended, the Act does apply to foreclosing mortgagees); Cornelio, supra note 16, at 363-64 (arguing that the Act protects tenants
"outside the landlord-tenant relationship"). But see Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at
236, 638 A.2d at 1314 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no evidence
to support a finding that the Legislature intended the Act to apply to mortgagees);
Hensel, supra note 9, at 323 (criticizing the appellate division decision in Guttenberg
and stating that the court overlooked a significant issue-mortgagee's rights).
135 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 235, 638 A.2d at 1314.
136 Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Although applying its decision prospectively, the court noted that generally there is a presumption of retroactive application
of judicial decisions. Id. (citing Rutherford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 99 N.J. 8,
21, 489 A.2d 1148, 1155 (1985)). In Rutherford, the court explained that a decision
can be applied prospectively when policy considerations weigh against retroactivity.
Rutherford Educ. Ass'n, 99 NJ. at 21, 489 A.2d at 1155 (quotation omitted). The court
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Justice Garibaldi, joined by Justices Clifford and Pollock, dissented. 137 Strongly criticizing the majority for holding the Act applicable to all foreclosing mortgagees, 13 1 the dissent accused the
stated that after the threshold requirement of establishing "a new rule of law" has
been met, the court's decision can be applied in one of four ways. Id. at 21, 22, 489
A.2d at 1155 (citation omitted). According to the Rutherford court, those four ways
are: (1) entirely prospectively; (2) prospectively except for the parties involved in the
instant case; (3) partially retroactively so as to apply to similar cases still pending; or
(4) entirely retroactively so as to effect past final judgments. Id. at 22, 489 A.2d at
1155 (citation omitted). To choose among these options, a court should consider the
purpose of the decision and whether it would benefit from retroactive application,
whether people have relied upon the prior law, and the impact of retroactive application upon the administration of justice. Id., 489 A.2d at 1155-56 (citations omitted).
137 ChaseManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 235, 251, 638 A.2d at 1314, 1322 (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting).
138 Id. at 235-36, 638 A.2d at 1314 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quotation and citation
omitted). Justice Garibaldi illustrated the unfairness of subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to the Act by reference to MarylandNational Mortgage Corp. v. LittleJohn, a companion case to Chase Manhattan Bank. Id. at 236-38, 638 A.2d at 1314-15 (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting) (citing Maryland Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. LittleJohn, 261 N.J. Super. 428,
619 A.2d 241 (App. Div.), cert. granted, 133 N.J. 439, 440, 627 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1993),
appeal dismissed, 136 N.J. 292, 642 A.2d 1002 (1994)). In LittleJohn, George and
Gwendolyn Clapps executed a purchase money mortgage, recorded on February 5,
1988, in conjunction with the purchase of a single-family home. LittleJohn, 261 N.J.
Super. at 430-31, 619 A.2d at 243. The Clapps' later defaulted on the mortgage and
the mortgagee began foreclosure proceedings on November 12, 1991. Id. at 431, 619
A.2d at 243. On December 9, 1991, the mortgagee filed a lis pendens. Id. By filing a
lis pendens, the filing party gives notice of a pending lawsuit concerning property to
parties who may acquire an interest in that property. See BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 643
(abr. 6th ed. 1991). As a result, acquiring parties will know that all interests in that
property are subject to the court's decision. Id. Subsequently, on January 3, 1992,
Rebecca LittleJohn negotiated a lease with the Clapps' and thereafter took possession
of the property. LittleJohn, 261 N.J. Super. at 431, 619 A.2d at 243. The mortgagee
amended its complaint to include LittleJohn in the foreclosure action to gain possession. Id. LittleJohn then contended that the mortgagee was required to comply with
the Act in order to evict her. Id. at 435, 619 A.2d at 245. Ultimately, the supreme
court dismissed the LittleJohn case as moot because LittleJohn voluntarily vacated the
premises and because LittleJohn and Chase Manhattan Bank raised identical issues.
Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 214 n.1, 638 A.2d at 1304 n.1. The court further
noted that the secondary issues raised in LittleJohn concerning a mortgagee's decision
to file a lis pendens did not affect the Act's applicability to foreclosing mortgagees.
Id. Likewise, the court declined to restrict the Act's applicability in light of potential
decreases in the value of single-family homes. Id.
Dissenting in Chase ManhattanBank, Justice Garibaldi referred to LittleJohn to emphasize the inequity of granting a tenant's interest priority over the mortgage, even
though the mortgage and a lis pendens were duly recorded, prior-in-time interests.
Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 237, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting); see
Hensel, supra note 9, at 324 (arguing that giving subsequent tenants priority over the
mortgagee's rights contradicts the state's recording system). Under the majority's decision, the dissent proclaimed, the mortgagee in LittleJohnwould be left with a singlefamily residence saddled with "a perpetual tenant" as security for a defaulted loan.
Chase ManhattanBank, 135 NJ. at 237, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Given the difficulty of selling an occupied home, the dissent suggested, few mortga-
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court of improperly inferring a legislative intent to overrule Guttenberg and ignoring the history of the 1986 amendments.1 3 9 Specifically, Justice Garibaldi reasoned that the phrase "the owner's or
landlord's successor in ownership or possession" was too ambiguous to indicate a legislative intent to extend the Act to foreclosing

mortgagees. 140
Justice Garibaldi then rejected the majority's contention that
the plain language of section 2A:18-61.3(b) supported the court's

holding.1 41 The ambiguous language of the amendment, the justice insisted, was insufficient to evidence a legislative intent to overrule the Guttenbergcourt's construction of the Act.1 42 Noting that
neither the amendments nor their statutory history made any mention of mortgagees or the Guttenberg decision, the dissent found it
inconceivable that the Legislature intended to modify foreclosing
mortgagee's rights so extensively.1 43 Next, discrediting the majorgees would risk lending money to purchase property when the security for the debt is
so encumbered. See id. But see § 2A:18-61.1() (indicating that the intent of a purchaser to personally occupy the premises justifies eviction).
Next, Justice Garibaldi belittled the value of allowing the mortgagee to renegotiate unfavorable leases, especially in situations where no lease existed. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 237-38, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). As support,
the justice highlighted the difficulties Chase encountered in its attempts to require
the Josephsons to pay market rent. Id. at 238, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
139 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 236, 638 A.2d at 1314 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
140 Id. (quoting § 2A:18-61.3(b)). The dissent was unwilling to abrogate foreclosing
mortgagees' property rights without strong evidence that the Legislature intended
such a result. Id.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's contention that the Josephsons
could not be evicted under the unamended Act because the Josephsons' tenancy
commenced prior to the mortgage. Id. at 238, 638 A.2d at 1315 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Differentiating between leaseholds and tenancies, the dissent maintained that
as month-to-month tenants, rather than leaseholders, the Josephsons were not protected by Guttenberg. Id. at 238-39, 638 A.2d at 1315-16 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623, 428 A.2d 1289, 1292
(1981)) (quotation and other citations omitted). The dissent therefore concluded
that Chase could terminate the Josephsons' tenancy upon proper notice because they
were month-to-month tenants. Id. at 239, 638 A.2d at 1316 (citations omitted).
141 Id.
142 Id. For a discussion of the majority's "plain language" arguments, see supra
notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
143 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 240, 638 A.2d at 1316 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice enunciated two principles of statutory construction supporting this
conclusion. Id. (quotation and citations omitted). First, the dissent emphasized that
the Legislature is familiar with both the legislation it enacts and the judiciary's construction thereof. Id. (citing Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 14, 334 A.2d 321, 328
(1975)) (quotation omitted). Second, the dissent commented that a court should not
ascribe to the Legislature the desire to alter the existing law without a clear indication
of that intent. Id. (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428,
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ity's interpretation, Justice Garibaldi offered an alternative reading
of section 2A:18-61.3 (b) which would not subject foreclosing mortgagees to the Act. 144 Such a reading was warranted, the justice
proffered, because foreclosing mortgagees do not become successors in interest until an order for possession is obtained or a foreclosure sale has occurred. 145 Furthermore, the dissenting justice
emphasized that the amendment was intended to prevent parties
from circumventing the Act by engaging in false pretexts. 146
Proceeding, Justice Garibaldi attacked the majority's argument that those provisions exempting purchasers at foreclosure
sales from owner liability confirmed the Act's general applicability
to foreclosing mortgagees.1 4 7 The dissent asserted that the issue in
this case was whether a mortgagee was a successor in interest under
section 2A:1S-61.3(b), characterizing the majority's analysis of
mortgagees as "owners" under certain provisions as irrelevant. 1"
Additionally, Justice Garibaldi reminded the court of Guttenberg's
conclusion that foreclosing mortgagees were not owners under the
Act. 14 9 Dismissing the majority's conclusion, the dissenting justice
claimed that the statutory exemption contained in section 2A:1861.6(e) merely implied that purchasers at foreclosure sales were
439, 619 A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div.), rev'd, 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994) and
Elberon Bathing Co.v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 1, 18, 389 A.2d 439, 447 (1978)).
144 Id. at 241, 638 A.2d at 1316-17 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (emphasis added). The dissent reasoned that a foreclosing mortgagee did
not become an "owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession" until the
superior court issues an order for possession or the mortgagee purchases the property
at a foreclosure sale. Id., 638 A.2d at 1317 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (quoting § 2A:1861.3(b)). The dissent then explained that the statute's prohibition against successors
in possession or ownership obtaining an order for possession pertained only to parties
who had already succeeded to their interest prior to requesting possession. Id. Because a foreclosing mortgagee does not succeed to a possessory or ownership interest
until an order for possession has been granted or a foreclosure sale has been completed, the dissent concluded that § 2A18-61.3(b) was inapplicable. Id. (emphasis
added). But see § 2A:18-61.2 (historical note) (stating that the 1986 amendments
were to be liberally construed).
146 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 241, 638 A.2d at 1317 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). One possible scenario that the amendments were intended to prevent, the dissent opined, was instances in which "affiliated entities" engaged in false conveyances
in an attempt to change owners and avoid having to comply with the Act. Id.
147 Id. at 242, 638 A.2d at 1317 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (presenting the majority's argument that
the exemption for purchasers at a foreclosure sale from treble-damages for pretextual
evictions indicates that the Legislature believed foreclosing mortgagees were subject
to the Act).
148 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 242, 638 A.2d at 1317 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
149 Id. (citing Guttenberg Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 629-30, 428 A.2d
1289, 1296 (1981)).
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not responsible for evictions resulting from the former owner's decision to remove the property from residential use. 150
Having opined that the plain language of the amendments did
not implicate mortgagees, Justice Garibaldi turned to the legislative history to show that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend
to subject foreclosing mortgagees to the Act."5 Looking first at the
legislative findings enacted in section 2A:18-61.1a, the dissent highlighted the Legislature's concern with problems arising from the
conversion of units to more profitable uses and from the circumvention of state eviction laws. 152 As a result, the dissenting justice
reported that the legislative history revealed the intent to prevent
landlords from engaging in pretextual evictions, not an intent to
modify mortgagees' rights. 15 3 Justice Garibaldi finally noted that
150 Id. at 243, 638 A.2d at 1317-18 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see
§ 2A:18-61.6(e) (providing that purchasers at a foreclosure sale are not liable for damages imposed by § 2A:18-61.6(c)); § 2A:18-61.6(c) (imposing treble-damages on owners who purport to permanently retire the premises from residential use and then
return the property to such use in less than five years).
151 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 243, 638 A.2d at 1318 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
152 Id. at 243-44, 638 A.2d at 1318 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing § 2A:1861.1a(a)) (quotations omitted). According to the justice, the Legislature did not indicate problems caused by foreclosing mortgagees. Id. While no reference is made to
mortgagees, however, the dissent noted the specific reference to landlords and tenants. See § 2A18-61.1a(b). The Legislature found that:
a. Acute State and local shortages of supply and high levels of demand
for residential dwellings have motivated removal of blameless tenants in order to directly or indirectly profit from conversion to
higher income rental or ownership interest residential use.
b. This has resulted in unfortunate attempts to displace tenants employing pretexts, stratagems or means other than those provided
pursuant to the intent of state eviction laws designated to fairly balance and protect rights of tenants and landlords.
c. These devices have circumvented the intent of current State eviction laws by failing to utilize available means to avoid displacement

d.

It is in the public interest of the State to maintain for citizens the
broadest protections available under State eviction laws to avoid
such displacement and resultant lose of affordable housing ....
§ 2A:18-61.1a(a)-(d) (emphasis added).
153 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 244-45, 638 A.2d at 1318-19 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting) (quotations and citations omitted). Justice Garibaldi commented that
Senate Bill 1912 and Assembly Bill 1840 represented the two pre-enactment versions
of the 1986 amendments to the Act. Id. at 244, 638 A.2d at 1318 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The statements accompanying these bills, the justice highlighted, referred
to actions by the landlord or owner and made no reference to mortgagees. See Statement Accompanying Senate Bill No. 1912 at 5 (1986) (stating that "[It]his bill would
prevent landlords from using certain legal pretexts to eject tenants in order to make
the building available for conversion to condominiums or cooperatives, or for subsequent rental at more lucrative rates") (emphasis added); Senate Labor, Industry and
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Governor Kean's statements regarding landlord abuse demonstrated the Governor's understanding that the Act did not apply to
foreclosing mortgagees.' 4
Next, Justice Garibaldi articulated that recent legislative activity confirmed that the Legislature had not intended the 1986
amendments to apply to foreclosing mortgagees."5 ' The dissent
noted that the Legislature declined to pass Assembly Bill 2402,
which would have clearly brought foreclosing mortgagees within
the scope of the Act.15 6 Similarly, the dissent opined that recent
Professions Committee Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for S-1912 and A1840 at 1 (1986) (stating that "[t]his bill addresses abuses that tenants suffer when a
landlordevicts them because he seeks to permanently board up or demolish his building or seeks to retire permanently the building from residential use and then subsequently allows residential occupancy of the building") (emphasis added); Statement
Accompanying Assembly Bill No. 1840 at 3 (1986) (stating that "[t] his bill would prevent apartment house owners from using certain legal pretexts to eject tenants in order to make the building available for conversion to condominiums or cooperatives,
or for subsequent rental at more lucrative rates") (emphasis added); Assembly Housing Committee Statement to Assembly No. 1840 at 1 (1986) (stating that "[t]his bill
... would prevent apartment house owners from using certain legal pretexts to eject
tenants in order to make the building available for conversion to condominiums or
cooperatives, or for subsequent rental at more lucrative rates") (emphasis added).
Each statement then explains that once the property is removed from residential use,
the landlord or owner cannot resume residential use for five years, must notify prospective purchasers of the restrictions on the property, and is liable for treble-damages if the property is returned to residential use in less than five years. See id.
Justice Garibaldi noted that one statement, Statement Accompanying Proposed
Amendments to Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 1912, and Assembly
Bill No. 1840, did refer to foreclosures. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 245, 638
A.2d at 1319 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). That statement notes an
exemption in one section of the amendments for a "purchaser (or his successor) of
premises at a foreclosure sale, execution sale or bankruptcy sale... (when the former
owner... sought to retire permanently the premises from residential use or to permanently board up or demolish the premises and evicted the tenants)." Statement Accompanying Proposed Amendments to Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
No. 1912 and Assembly Bill No. 1840 at 2-3 (1986). Accordingly, Justice Garibaldi
emphasized that the amendments' applicability to purchasers at foreclosure sales was
limited to that context. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 245, 638 A.2d at 1319 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The amendment did not, the justice announced, indicate that
the remainder of the Act applied to foreclosing mortgagees. Id.
154 Id. at 245-46, 638 A.2d at 1319 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Governor's
News Release for S-1912/A-1840, Oct. 29, 1986, at 1) (quotations omitted). The Governor stated that the amendments "provid[ed] more protection for tenants against
inequitable displacement by landlords." Governor's News Release for S-1912/A-1840,
Oct. 29, 1986, at 1.
155 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 246, 638 A.2d at 1319 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quotation and citation omitted).
156 Id. Assembly Bill 2402 was introduced in the second session of the 205th Legislature. Id. The bill provided that the terms landlord and owner included "a mortgagee .

.

. which has foreclosed .

.

. and taken possession of property." Assembly Bill

2402(2) (1993). A committee statement articulated the purpose of the bill:
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amendments that exempted foreclosing mortgagees from a requirement to provide relocation assistance for evicted tenants indicated a legislative intent to exclude the mortgagees from other
provisions of the Act.1 57 What these sections did acknowledge, the
dissent proffered, was that mortgagees acquiring an interest
through foreclosure were not
responsible for the consequences of
5 8
the former owner's actions.'

Finally, Justice Garibaldi noted the persuasive public policy arguments for refusing to extend the scope of the Act to foreclosing
mortgagees.1 59 Specifically, the dissent argued that by prohibiting
the mortgagee from evicting, without cause, a tenant who took possession under a lease executed after the mortgage, the majority
denigrated the priority scheme established by the New Jersey Recording Act.160 Furthermore, addressing the practical problems associated with subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to the Act, the
The purpose of this bill is to reaffirm the intent of the Legislature
in enacting the 1986 amendments to the Anti-Eviction law by including
foreclosing mortgagees and other lienholders ... as parties who must
comply with . . . the anti-eviction act . ..

when evicting tenants from

certain rental property... It is the Legislature's intent that mortgagees
that foreclose on rental property covered by the act must comply with
the provisions of the act, and may evict tenants only on the basis of
"good cause" as provided by the act.
Assembly Housing Committee, Statement to Assembly, No. 2402 at 1 (1993). Bill
2402 passed in the Assembly, but did not come up for vote in the Senate. Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 246, 638 A.2d at 1319 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). At the time
of the court's decision, a similar bill, Assembly No. 178, was pending in the 206th
session of the Legislature. Id.; see Assembly Bill 178 (1994) (stating that foreclosing
mortgagees were subject to the Act). Adoption of such a bill, the dissent implied,
would constitute the unambiguous action necessary to overturn the holding enunciated in Guttenberg. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 247, 638 A.2d at 1320 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
157 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 246, 247, 638 A.2d at 1320 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Garibaldi referred to §§ 2A:18-61.1g and -61.1h. Id. at
247, 638 A.2d at 1320 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The former provides that a municipality could enact an ordinance requiring the owner to contribute to evicted tenants'
relocation costs under certain circumstances, but that "mortgagees in possession ...
through foreclosure" are not included in this section. § 2A:18-61.lg(a) & (d). The
latter provides that an owner is required to pay relocation costs of certain tenants in
municipalities not passing the ordinance authorized under § 2A:l8-61.1g, but that
"mortgagees in possession. . . through foreclosure" are excluded from the operation
of this section. § 2A:18-61.lh(a) & (e). For a discussion of the majority's treatment of
§§ 2A.18-61.lg and -61.1h, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
158 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 NJ. at 247, 638 A.2d at 1320 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
159 Id. at 247-48, 638 A.2d at 1320, 1321 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quotations and
citations omitted).
160 Id. at 248, 638 A.2d at 1320 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
Under the recording system, a properly recorded instrument gives notice to all subsequent interested parties that the recorded interest takes priority over all subsequent
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dissenting justice warned that the majority's decision could reduce
the level of mortgage funding available in New Jersey.' 61 The dissent thus proffered that the potential decrease in the value of residential property as security for loans, the unwillingness of
mortgage institutions to operate apartment buildings, and the difficulties involved in renegotiating leases with the existing tenants
could discourage institutional lending. 6 '
Summarizing, Justice Garibaldi reiterated that there was no evidence that the Legislature intended the 1986 amendments to subinterests. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:21-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994)). Section
46:21-1 states:
[W] henever any deed or instrument ... which shall have been or shall
be duly acknowledged or proved and certified, shall have been or shall
be duly recorded or lodged for record with the county recording officer
...such record shall, from that time, be notice to all subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees of the execution of the
deed or instrument so recorded and of the contents thereof.
§ 46:21-1. As the holder of a duly recorded, prior interest, the dissent reasoned, the
mortgagee takes priority over a subsequent leaseholder. See Chase Manhattan Bank,
135 N.J. at 248, 638 A-2d at 1320 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). The
dissent charged, however, that the majority's decision bestowed superior rights upon
the tenant, "'in complete derogation of the recording policy that a first-in-time interest in realty has priority.'" Id. (quoting Hensel, supra note 9, at 324). Because such a
conflict between policies existed, the dissent opined that the Legislature, not the
courts, should weigh competing interests. Id., 638 A.2d at 1320-21 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Hensel, supra note 9, at 326) (quotation omitted).
161 Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 249, 638 A.2d at 1321 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1064) (quotation omitted). Such a result, the
dissent remarked, would be contrary to the Act's primary purpose of protecting tenants. Id.
162 Id. at 248-49, 638 A.2d at 1321 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Tonrey, supra
note 8, at 1064) (quotation omitted). The Guttenberg court voiced similar concerns,
including the potential impairment of the security given for a loan and mortgagees'
reluctance to act as landlords for apartment houses. Guttenberg Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 632, 633, 425 A.2d 1289, 1297, 1298 (1981) (citations omitted).
The dissent's fear that mortgagees might stop lending funds in New Jersey is
based upon the effect that Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine had upon the
mortgage market in the District of Columbia. Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 249,
638 A.2d at 1321 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Administrator of Veterans Affairs v.
Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 1985)) (other citation omitted). In Valentine, the
court held that the District's anti-eviction laws prevented the mortgage insurer from
evicting the defaulted mortgagor's tenant without cause. Valentine, 490 A.2d at 1166
(citation omitted). For a more in-depth discussion of the Valentine case, see supra
notes 67-75 and accompanying text. As a result of that case, one mortgage lender
withdrew from the District of Columbia market. See Baione, supra note 65, at 1134
n.10 (reporting that a mortgage lender, which extended $25-30 million of credit annually, decided to cease lending in the District due to Valentine's retroactive effect on
the value of property as security). But see Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1064-65 (suggesting
that mortgagees' fears may be unfounded given the operating effect of the amended
Act and the possibility that existing leases could enhance property values).
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ject foreclosing mortgagees to the Act. 163 Acknowledging the
strong arguments asserted by both parties, the justice pronounced
that the Legislature, rather than the courts, must choose between
competing values." 0
The Anti-Eviction Act was designed to protect residential tenants from the harsh consequences of unwarranted and arbitrary
evictions.165 Because the Act's primary purpose is to protect tenants from eviction, the status of the evicting party should be of no
only proconsequence. 166 As originally enacted, however, the Act1 67
hibited landlords from removing tenants without cause.
The decision to amend section 2A:18-61.3 of the Act
presented the Legislature with an opportunity to render the status
of the evicting party irrelevant. As the Chase court persuasively
demonstrated, section 2A:18-61.3(b) can be construed to apply to
163 Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 250-51, 638 A.2d at 1322 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Had the Legislature intended such a result, the dissent insisted, the public
policy concerns underlying this issue would have been addressed by the Legislature
prior to the adoption of the amendments. Id. at 250, 638 A.2d at 1321-22 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). As Justice Garibaldi noted, the plaintiff argued
that subjecting mortgagees to the Act would lead to an eventual decrease in the
amount of available mortgage funding. Id., 638 A.2d at 1321 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Conversely, the dissent noted, the defendant argued that refusing to apply the
Act to mortgagees would result in immediate hardship to tenants facing foreclosure
related evictions. Id.
165 For a more in-depth discussion of the purpose of the Act, see supra note 14.
166 See Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1047 (arguing that construing the amended Act as
applicable to foreclosing mortgagees comports with the broad purpose of the Act).
Cornelio, for example, commented that "[a] tenant's need for housing . . . is unchanged by the circumstances of the mortgagee's foreclosure." Cornelio, supra note
16, at 363-64. The commentator further argued that foreclosing mortgagees should
be required to comply with the Act because such a requirement would further the
legislative goal of tenant protection. Id. at 364. The consequences to the tenant are
the same regardless of whether the landlord or the mortgagee causes the eviction. See
Guttenberg,85 N.J. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (stating that "[ilt
is obviously of no matter to an evicted tenant if he loses his home, through no fault of
his own, because of arbitrary conduct on the part of his original landlord or because a
mortgagee has foreclosed on a mortgage loan extended to that landlord").
In contrast, Tonrey acknowledged the possibility that mortgagees might withdraw
from the NewJersey residential mortgage market due to the costs and inconveniences
of complying with the Act. See Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1064. Tonrey also recognized
that the resulting decrease in mortgage funding would be detrimental to tenants because it would reduce the amount of funds available for affordable housing. Id.
167 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623-24, 428 A.2d at 1292-93 (emphasizing the significance of the use of the word "landlord" in the original Act and holding that the Act
did not apply to foreclosing mortgagees). But see id. at 635, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (opining that because the Legislature had not provided a statutory definition of "landlord," the court was free to define the term as including
mortgagees for the purposes of this Act) (citations omitted).

1330

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1292

foreclosing mortgagees. 168 The question therefore becomes
whether the New Jersey Legislature intended such a construction
when it enacted the amendments.
At first glance, it appears that the Legislature did not intend to
subject foreclosing mortgagees to the Act. The articulated purpose
of the amendments was to prevent landlords from engaging in pretexts to circumvent the requirements of the Act.1 69 As the majority's strained analysis of the provisions relating to this purpose
suggests, the stated purpose of the amendments does not evince a
decision to prohibit foreclosing mortgagees from evicting
tenants. 7 °
If one looks beyond the stated purpose, however, there are
several indications that the 1986 amendments were partially
designed to pertain to foreclosing mortgagees. As explained by the
Chase court, the amended version of section 2A:18-61.3 responds to
the Guttenbergopinion point for point.'17 It is unrealistic to believe
that the Legislature could enact a provision so well tailored to the
Guttenberg case without recognizing that the amendments opened
the door to include foreclosing mortgagees within the scope of the
Act. Furthermore, the Legislature's failure to define an "owner's
or landlord's successor in ownership or possession" provided the
168 See Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 225, 638 A.2d at 1309 (stating that the
language of § 2A:18-61.3 indicates that foredosing mortgagees are subject to the Act);
Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1042-43 (analyzing the amendments to § 2A:18-61.3 and concluding that, as amended, that section encompasses foreclosing mortgagees).
169 For a discussion of the legislative history setting forth the Act's purpose, see
supra note 109. See also § 2A:18-61.1a (noting the Legislature's finding that landlords
have utilized pretexts to avoid the requirements of the Act).
170 The Chase majority contends that the existence of provisions exempting foreclosing mortgagees from liability in certain instances affirms the legislative intent to
subject mortgagees to the Act. See Chase ManhattanBank, 135 N.J. at 231, 638 A.2d at
1312-13 (quotations omitted). Specifically, these provisions were designed to punish
owners who attempt to circumvent the Act by imposing treble-damage liability on
those owners who prematurely offered purportedly "retired" property for residential
use. See § 2A:18-61.6(c) (imposing treble-damages on an owner who prematurely returns the property to residential use); see also § 2A.l8-61.6(e) (exempting "purchasers
at a foreclosure sale" from liability under § 2A:18-61.6(c)). These liability provisions
are clearly directed toward the goal of discouraging pretextual evictions. The decision to hold purchasers at a foreclosure sale financially blameless for the acts of the
previous owners does not easily translate into a concession that foreclosing mortgagees are subject to the Act's eviction restrictions. Rather, these exemptions could
simply reflect a legislative concern that mortgagees may have difficulty selling property subject to the pretextual eviction provisions unless the purchaser of such property is assured that the property can be offered for residential use without penalty.
171 See Chase Manhattan Bank, 135 N.J. at 227, 228, 229, 638 A.2d at 1310, 1311
(quotations and citations omitted); see Tonrey, supra note 8, at 1042-43 (stating that as
amended, § 2A:18-61.3 addresses each issue the Guttenbergcourt found "dispositive" in
rendering its decision).
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court with an opportunity to protect tenants against foreclosing
mortgagees.17 2 These considerations demonstrate that the Chase
court was justified in determining that the amended Act applies to
foreclosing mortgagees evicting the defaulted mortgagor's tenants.
If this result is inconsistent with legislative intent, the Legislature
can overrule the court by amending the Act once again to unequiv173
ocally exclude foreclosing mortgagees from the Act's reach.
Robyn A. Kowantz

172 SeeTonrey, supra note 8, at 1010 n.12 (suggesting that the Legislature purposely
employed vague language in an effort to avoid a strict judicial interpretation of the
Act's scope).
173 The Legislature could amend the Act to exclude foreclosing mortgagees in several ways. For example, the Legislature could amend § 2A18-61.3 to specifically exclude mortgagees. Alternatively, the Legislature could explicitly define the parties it
intends to reach with the phrase "an owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or
possession." Finally, the Legislature could provide that foreclosure is an acceptable
ground for eviction under the Act.

